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The current international tax regime is a flawed miracle.1 It is a
miracle because taxes are the last topic on which one would expect sovereign nations to reach a consensus. International taxation is, to some extent,
a zero-sum game: one country's gain in revenue is another's loss. If
income is derived by a resident of one country from sources in another,
and if both countries have a legitimate claim to tax that income and the
ability to enforce that claim, then either country will lose revenue by
agreeing to grant the other the primary right to tax that income.
Nevertheless, and contrary to a priori expectations, a coherent
international tax regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support and that
underlies the complexities of the international aspects of individual
countries' tax systems. 2 This regime was first developed in the 1920s,
when the League of Nations first undertook to study ways to avoid international double taxation,3 and has been embodied both in the model tax
treaties developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the United Nations and in the multitude of
bilateral treaties that are based on those models.4 The existence of this

1. The literature on international taxation is immense and can only be highlighted here. The best
recent surveys of the entire international tax regime are SOL PICCIOrO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TAXATION: A STUDY INTHE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BUSINESS REOULATION (1992), which, as its
name indicates, focuses mostly on corporate tax issues, and ADRIAN OGLEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX: A MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1993), which provides a brief but excellent
general overview. See also Ricard J. Vann, InternationalIncome Taxation, in TAXATION IN
DEVELoPINo COUNTRIES (Victor Thuronyi ed., forthcoming) (examining international income tax
regimes and focusing on developing countries and countries in transition from centrally planned to
market economies). An important recent article on the issues related to the taxation of multinationals
is Robert A. Green, The Futureof Source-BasedTaxation of the Income of MultinationalEnterprises,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 18 (1993), and an important recent proposal for reforming the United States
international tax system from an economist's perspective is GARY C. HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (1992). An older but still useful article is Charles
1. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1981). Of the
treatises on United States international taxation, the most useful are JOSEPH ISENBERGH,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN TAXPAYERS AND FOREIGN INCOME (1990)
and JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1992).
2. The existence of a coherent regime can be demonstrated by the many books and articles which
survey various aspects of the regime on a comparative basis. See, e.g., ARVID A. SKAAR, PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENT: EROSION OF A TAX TREATY PRINCIPLE (1991) (discussing the basis for taxing foreign
businesses and considering whether the established method is appropriate for every country in the
modem world); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 411 (1995) (noting the existence of an international consensus on jurisdiction to tax);
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, AMERICAN LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES
INCOME TAXATION I1, PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 5 (1992) (stating that
certain provisions are included in almost all tax treaties). A review of the proceedings of the
congresses of the International Fiscal Association, see, e.g., Avv. Pietro Adonnino, Non-discrimination
Rules in InternationalTaxation, 78b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 19 (1993), or the
comparison of any two bilateral tax treaties will also suffice to reveal a common underlying
international tax structure.
3. Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doe. E.F.S. 73 F. 19 (1923).
4. See, e.g., ORGANIZATIONFORECONOMICCO-OPERATIONAND DEv.,MODELTAX CONVENTION
ON INCOME AND CAPITAL, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 191 (Sept. 1, 1992) [hereinafter OECD MODEL
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regime shows that despite each country's claim to sovereignty in tax

matters, it is possible to reach an internationally acceptable consensus that
will be followed by the majority of the world's taxing jurisdictions. This
international tax regime, based on voluntary consensus, can be regarded as
one of the major achievements of twentieth-century international law.5

Yet the miracle is flawed. The current regime suffers from significant
weaknesses, especially in two areas in which the development of the world

economy has made the principles that were agreed upon in the 1920s and
1930s obsolete: the growth of internationally mobile capital markets for
portfolio investment and the rise of integrated multinational enterprises
(MNEs).6 Thus, as this century nears its end, it is time to re-examine the
prevailing international tax regime and ask whether a new consensus can
be reached to remedy the regime's major weaknesses and ensure its contin-

ued viability in the next century.
This Article seeks to do so in four parts. Part I describes the structure
of the international tax regime and how this structure reflects a consensus
about the allocation of taxable income among taxing jurisdictions.

TREATY] (proposing a model convention that includes a provision for eliminating double taxation);
UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doe.
ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL TREATY] (setting forth a
model treaty to encourage the formation of tax treaties without protracted negotiations); INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND

FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND TEE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION

WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 211 (June 16, 1981)
[hereinafter U.S. MODEL TREATY] (covering most federal income taxes and certain excise taxes),
withdrawn by Treasury Dep't News Release NB-1990 (July 17, 1992), reprinted in 1992-13 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 46,416. There are currently over 1200 bilateral tax treaties, and almost all
OECD member countries have tax treaties with each other. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1993: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION 34 (1993) [hereinafter UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT].
5. Indeed, much of the international tax regime can be regarded as customary international law.
Customary international law can be defined as "a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation," RESTATEMENT CTHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987), and can be derived from a general pattern found in treaties. See,
e.g., Anthony A. D'Amato, Treaties as a Source of GeneralRules oflnternationalLaw,HARV. INT'L
L. CLUB I., Apr. 1962, at 1, 5 (arguing that the treaties provide a basis for customary international law
separate from "the classic usage-into-custom pattern"); Richard R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary InternationalLaw, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1968) (discussing the weight
given to treaties in determining customary international law); Ibrahim P.I. Shihata, The Treaty as a Law
Declaringand Custom-Making Instrument, 22 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INT'L 51 (1966) (evaluating the role of treaties in formulating general rules for all countries). An open question is whether
a taxpayer can rely on customary international law in challenging a national law that contravenes the
agreed-upon consensus. See Chantal Thomas, Customary International Law and State Taxation of
Corporate Income: SaparateAccountingvs. Formulary Apportionment (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Texas Law Review).
6. These two problem areas are also emphasized by HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 4-8. See also
Green, supra note 1 (emphasizing the problem of taxing multinationals).
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Specifically, the international consensus allocates active business income
to the jurisdiction from which it derives (the source jurisdiction) and
passive income to the jurisdiction in which the investor resides (the
residence jurisdiction). Part I also discusses two possible alternatives to
this consensus-taxing all income in either the residence jurisdiction or the
source jurisdiction-but concludes that the current consensus is superior to
both. Part II describes how the international aspects of United States tax
law fit the international tax regime outlined in Part I and suggests ways in
which details of the United States regime that are incongruent with the
international consensus may be modified unilaterally. Part Ill of the
Article identifies the two principal weaknesses of the current regime: the
difficulty of enforcing residence-based taxation of individuals and the
difficulty of allocating the income of MNEs among source jurisdictions.
Part Ill then explains why these problems can only be resolved by
multilateral action and describes the recommended solutions: enforcement
of residence-based taxation through backup withholding by source jurisdictions and agreement on a unitary method to be used to allocate the
profits of MNEs in the absence of comparable transactions. Finally, Part
IV describes an alternative international tax regime that is based on the
current international consensus, but incorporates the solutions identified in
Part I and is considerably simpler than the present structure. Part IV also
identifies the implications of the proposal for United States tax law and
discusses ways in which the proposal may be applied by jurisdictions that
adopt an integrated approach to the taxation of corporations and their
shareholders.
I.

The Structure of International Taxation

A.

The Active or PassiveDistinction in InternationalTaxation

1. HistoricalDevelopment.-In1923, a committee of four economists
submitted a report to the League of Nations that set out the basic principles
underlying international tax jurisdiction for the first time.7 The report
pointed out that an income tax based on ability to pay does not answer the
question of whose ability to pay is to be considered in each taxing
jurisdiction.8 To answer this question, the report developed the "doctrine
of economic allegiance," which underlies modem discussions of jurisdiction to tax.9 Fundamentally, the report endorsed two bases for
economic allegiance, which justify a country's imposition of tax: where

7. Report on Double Taxation, supra note 3.
8. Id. at 18-20.
9. Id. at 20-22.
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income is produced (the source jurisdiction) and where it is consumed or
saved (the residence jurisdiction).1"
The 1923 report also addressed the issue of double taxation: as
between the source and residence jurisdictions, which one has the prior
claim to tax income deriving from one jurisdiction by a resident of the

other and which one has the obligation to prevent double taxation by giving
up its claim? On practical grounds, the source jurisdiction should have the
prior right because it can generally impose its taxes on income deriving
from within it first." However, the 1923 report recommended that in
future negotiations between tax jurisdictions, income items should be
classified according to whether the primary economic activity giving rise

to the income takes place in the source country or in the residence country
and that the prior right to tax the income should be divided accordingly

between them. 2

2. Present Consensus and the International Tax Treaty Network.-

These principles underlie the development of the current consensus
regarding the proper allocation of taxable income among taxing jurisdictions. Although the source country is granted the prior right to tax all

income and the residence country has the primary obligation to prevent
double taxation, 3 this is only a concession to the source country's ability
to impose taxes first and does not reflect the optimal allocation. Instead,
the ultimate goal underlying the international tax regime is that active
business income should be taxed in the country in which it originates (the

source country) and passive income should be taxed in the country in
which the recipient of the income resides (the residence country). 4

10. Id. at 25. The report identifies four bases for economic allegiance: where wealth is produced,
where it is finally located, where rights over it can be enforced, and where it is consumed or otherwise
disposed of; the first and fourth bases-sourceand residence, respectively-were identified as the most
important. Id.
11. Id. at 40 ("A survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how completely Governments
are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner.... From this flows the consequence that, when
double taxation is involved, Governments would be prepared to give up residence rather than origin
as establishing the prime right.").
12. Id. at 40-42. The report discussed four methods of avoiding double taxation: taxation based
entirely on source (with residual residence-based taxation); taxation based entirely on residence;
formulary allocation; and taxationbased on source or residence, depending on the type of income. The
report rejected the first option, considered the second as an ideal unlikely to be realized, and opted for
the fourth, possibly modified by the third, as the most practical option. Id. at 45-51. This conclusion
retains much of its value today. See infra Part IV.
13. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901 (1994) (upholding a residence country's obligation to prevent double
taxation by unilaterally granting a credit for all foreign income taxes up to the United States tax rate).
14. See generally Hugh J. Ault, CorporateIntegration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the
InternationalTax Base: Principlesand Practices, 47 TAX L. REv. 565, 565 (1992) (noting that the
"classical" system of corporation taxation dictates that the source country impose a tax on "corporate
cross-border investments" and that "[the residence country generally taxies] the remainder of corporate
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This consensus can best be seen in operation by examining the
extensive tax treaty network. 15 Tax treaties reflect the active or passive
distinction in two ways. First, they define what constitutes an active
business operation in a given country (a "permanent establishment") and
give the source country the primary right to tax the profits from that
operation. 6 The residence country is required to exempt those profits
from tax, at least to the extent they were taxed by the source country,
either by exempting foreign source business income from tax or by
granting a foreign tax credit with respect to that income. 7 Second, the
tax treaties seek to reduce as much as possible the taxes levied by the
source country on passive income (such as income from dividends, interest,
and royalties) derived from within it, leaving the right to tax that income
to the residence country.'8
The tax treaties do not completely achieve their goal of dividing the
worldwide taxing jurisdiction between source and residence countries along
active or passive lines. First, the permanent establishment concept reflects
a compromise: not all active business income is taxable primarily in the
source country but rather only income that is attributable to a permanent
establishment; otherwise, international business would be subject to
burdensome administrative requirements of filing returns and paying tax in
every country in which it has a minimal presence. 9 However, the
threshold of what constitutes a permanent establishment is quite low: a
single office, or even a single agent with authority to conclude sales, is
generally sufficient.' Second, the taxation of passive income at its source

income"); Alvin C. Warren,Jr., Alternativesfor InternationalCorporateTax Refonn, 49 TAX L. REV.
599, 599-600 (1994) ("The conventional division of the international income tax base... is that the
source country has primary jurisdiction over corporate taxation, while the residence country has
primary jurisdiction over investor taxation."). For a discussion of the rationale for this division, see
infra subpart I(B).
15. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 7, 10, 11 (providing that interest and
dividends may be taxed by the residence country while business profits are taxed in the source country);
U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 7, 10, 11 (following in large part the OECD Model Treaty
in its treatment of passive and active business income); see also KEEs VAN RAAD, MODEL INCOME TAX
TRFATIES (2d ed. 1990) (providing a direct textual comparison of OECD, U.N., and United States
model tax treaties).
16. See, e.g., OECD MODELTREATY, supranote 4, arts. 5, 7; U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note
4, arts. 5, 7 (both providing a detailed definition of "permanent establishment" and stating that a
country may tax profits attributable to a permanent establishment within its jurisdiction). On the
changing interpretation of these provisions, see SKAAR, supra note 2, at 71-101.
17. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 7, 23; U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra
note 4, arts. 7, 23 (both providing two methods for the residence country to avoid double taxation of
business profits from permanent establishments in other countries).
18. OECD MODEL TREATY, supranote 4, arts. 10-12; U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, arts.
10-12 (both addressing dividends, interest, and royalties respectively).
19. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 7; U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 7.
20. OECD MODEL TREATY, supranote 4, art. 5; U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 5; see
also SKAAR, supra note 2, at 571-74 (noting the gradual erosion of the permanent establishment concept
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is not completely abolished, but it is reduced in most treaties to the lowest
possible levels. For example, the 1992 OECD Model Income Tax Treaty
recommends tax rates of 5% to 15% on dividends, 10% on interest, and

0% on royalties; the 1981 United States Model Income Tax Treaty recommends tax rates of 5% to 15% on dividends, and 0% on interest and
royalties.2 ' These low withholding tax rates represent a compromise
between the desire of the source country to levy some tax on income
derived by foreigners from within the country and the international consensus that such income should be taxed primarily in the residence country.

In the absence of a treaty, much higher withholding tax rates may apply,'
but these rates reflect the fact that in the absence of a treaty, the source
country has no assurance that the income will in fact be taxed by the
residence country, and therefore the source country arrogates to itself the
taxes that should otherwise be paid to the residence country.
3. Reasonsfor the Distinction.-Nevertheless,the distinction between
active and passive income is a fundamental element of the current regime.

Does this distinction reflect a real difference? There are three arguments
that it does. First, from an economic perspective, one may conceive of the
pool of worldwide income as being produced by value-adding firms.

firm is a joint venture of persons who invest in it, seeking returns.'

A

The

value added by each firm is the sum of its undistributed profits and the

dividends, interest, royalties, and rents that it pays; these last four
represent the different ways of distributing the firm's income among the
as the threshold becomes lower and lower). Arguably, in the modem world, where business can be
conducted by communications equipment that does not require a physical presence, the concept of a
permanent establishment is obsolete and should be replaced by a different type of threshold, such as
a percentage of the sales of the foreign entity or an absolute monetary de mbihni amount. Id. at 57374. The current debate in United States state taxation over whether "nexus," which is a constitutional
prerequisite to taxation, requires a physical presence reflects this tension. Several recent cases reflect
the trend away from reliance on a physical presence test. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 308, 313 (1992) (holding that a mail order business need not have a physical presence within a
state for the state to impose a sales tax on its sales, but must have a substantial nexus with the taxing
state); Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993) (holding that
neither the Due Process Clause's "minimum connection" test nor the Commerce Clause's "substantial
nexus" test, both of which must be satisfied in order for a state to tax the income of a corporation,
require a corporation's physical presence in the taxing state). The approach taken in Part IV would
replace the permanent establishment concept with the elements of a formula that will determine liability
to tax in a given jurisdiction.
21. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 10-12; U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, arts.
10-12 (both covering dividends, interest, and royalties respectively).
22. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (1994) (taxing nonresident alien individuals at a 30% rate on
income not connected with a United States trade or business); id.§ 881 (a) (taxing foreign corporations
at a 30% rate on income not connected with a United States trade or business).
23. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY &STEWARtT C. MYERS, PRINCIPLESOF CORPORATEFINANCE
5 (4th ed. 1991) (-[A] firm which acts in its stockholders' interest should accept those investments
which increase the value of their stake in the firm.").
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persons who invest in it.' The investment may be in the form of equity
capital, debt capital, or tangible and intangible assets; the distinction among
these forms of investment is the level and type of risk that the investor is
willing to undertake.'
From this perspective, the taxation of active
business income represents the taxation of the profits of the firm, and the
taxation of passive income represents the taxation of the division of those
profits among investors in the firm. The active or passive distinction in

international taxation reflects this economic analysis.
Second, the active or passive distinction reflects, to some extent, the

degree of control exercised over the activity.' Active business income
is generally derived from economic activities under the taxpayer's direct
control; in the international sphere, this income is derived from "foreign
direct investment."'

Passive income, on the other hand, is frequently

derived from activities in which the taxpayer has only a very small degree
of voting control, such as a small shareholder in a corporation or an
unrelated lender with voting control. However, passive income (in the
sense of distributions of a firm's earnings) may also be earned by persons
who control the underlying operations, such as a controlling shareholder
who is paid dividends or interest by her corporation. This second type of
passive income is frequently treated differently from passive portfolio

income,' but under the current consensus, it is still taxed primarily in the
country of residence of the controlling shareholder and not in the country

where the corporation engages in business.29 In the following discussion,

24. Cy. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
290 (1980) ("The firm is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs
and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs."). Wages paid to a firm's employees and
other suppliers of human capital are another way of distributing the firm's profits. See IRVIN M.
GROSSACK & DAVID D. MARTIN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: MICROTHEORY AND THE FIRM'S
DECISIONS 14 (1973) (including labor among the inputs used to generate a firm's outputs). Because
wages are generally considered to be active income, we shall regard them, however, as active for the
purposes of the analysis. For an analysis of current United States law from this perspective, see Yosef
M. Edrey, Taxation of InternationalActivity: FDAP, ECI and the Dual Capacity of an Employee as
a Taxpayer, 15 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 1996).
25. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinanceand the
Theory of Investment, AM. ECON. REV., June 1958, at 261, 262 (noting that "[ilnvestment decisions
are.., supposed to be based on a comparison of [the] 'risk adjusted'.. yield with the market rate
of interest').
26. See generally HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at chs. 4, 7 (distinguishing portfolio income from
business income).
27. For a definition and discussion of foreign direct investment, see, e.g., UNCTAD WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-25; EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2d ed. 1991) (formally defining foreign direct investment as "ownership of assets by foreign residents for purposes of controlling the use of those assets').
28. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(h)(3), 882(c)(3) (1994) (denying shareholderswho own 10% or more
of a corporation the exemption from United States withholding tax otherwise available for "portfolio
interest").
29. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 10(2)(a), (b) (specifying a lower rate of
withholding tax for dividend payments made to 10% shareholders and thereby yielding greater taxing
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the term "portfolio income" will be reserved for passive income that is not

linked with control.
Third, the active or passive distinction is significant because, to a

substantial extent, it overlaps with the distinctions among publicly traded
corporations and individuals, close corporations, and other legal entities.
Much of the world's active income is earned by large, publicly traded
corporations, and in the international context, by MNEs; ° much of the
world's passive income is earned directly by individuals or through close

corporations or pass-through entities."
B. Is the Consensus Justified?
If the active or passive distinction reflects some economic reality, why
should active income be taxed on a source basis and passive income be
taxed on a residence basis? The 1923 League of Nations report attempted

to justify this distinction by analyzing which types of income derive more
from activities performed in each jurisdiction, but this type of analysis has
been rejected by modern economists, who cast doubt on whether income
can meaningfully be said to derive from one source rather than another.'

Instead, a better understanding of the logic behind the active or passive
distinction can be reached if one examines the two extreme alternatives:
taxing all income in the residence country and taxing all income in the
source country.
Robert Green has recently argued for the abolition of source-based

taxation because of its incompatibility with the modem notion of the ability
to pay. 3 Indeed, because the ability to pay is not accurately measured by
jurisdiction to the recipient's country of residence). The distinction in the model treaties between
dividends from direct investment and portfolio dividends is that the former are subject to lower
withholding taxes than the latter, perhaps due to the perception that they represent active business
profits that have already been subject to tax at the corporate level. See OECD MODEL TREATY, supra
note 4, art. 10(2)(a), (b); U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 10(2)(a), (b); U.S. MODEL
TREATY, supra note 4, art. 10(2)(a), (b) (all imposing lower withholding taxes on corporate shareholders with substantial interests than on other dividends).
30. The stock of foreign direct investment reached about $2 trillion in 1992, and the sales of
foreign affiliates of MNEs reached approximately $5.5 trillion in 1990, compared to only $4 trillion
in world exports of goods and non-factor services. In 1993, the largest 100 MNEs had $3.2 trillion
in global assets. UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 13, 22. In 1990, the top
300 MNEs accounted for about a quarter of the world's productive assets. Multinationals,Back in
Fashion,ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 55, 56.
31. See HUFrAUER, supra note 1, at 63-64 (noting the rise of portfolio investment). This
empirical distinction is discussed infra Part IV.
32. Report on Double Taxation, supra note 3, at 40-42. For a reaction by an economist to the
"scholastic" source of income rules, see HuFBAuR, supra note 1, at 98-100. For a general rejection
of the idea of source as an economic matter, see Hugh I. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing
InternationalIncome:An Analysis of the U.S. System and its Economic Premises, in TAXATION INTHE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 30-31 (AssafRazin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
33. Green, supra note 1, at 29.
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income from one source, but rather only by "all income from whatever
source derived,"'" it seems difficult to reconcile source jurisdiction with
an income tax based on the ability to pay. However, this argument by
itself does not explain why the residence jurisdiction should have the sole
claim to tax global income. If one focuses on economic allegiance, taxes
should be owed to both residence and source countries.35 Each of these
jurisdictions has the right to tax the taxpayer on her entire income, which
reflects her global ability to pay. However, because this result is
impracticable and would result in complete multiple taxation, one sensible
route would be to permit each jurisdiction to tax the income derived from
within it (that is, on a source basis), resulting in the taxpayer being taxed
in the aggregate on her global income according to her ability to pay. Of
course, each of the source jurisdictions may have a different tax rate
(including a zero rate), but the fact that a taxpayer's income may be taxed
at a lower rate in a source jurisdiction does not automatically give the
residence jurisdiction the residual right to tax that income.36
1. Individuals.-There appear, however, to be several solid grounds
for preferring residence over source taxation for individuals. The first is
a pragmatic ground: individuals can only be in one place at any given time.
Thus, residence for individuals is a relatively easy concept to establish, and
in fact, it is possible to set down bright-line rules for determining the fiscal
residence of individuals.37 On the other hand, determining the source of
income is a highly problematic endeavor, and in most cases, income will
have more than one source. Thus, if one jurisdiction is to be given the
primary right to tax individuals, the residence jurisdiction is an obvious
candidate.
Second, because most individuals have only one residence jurisdiction
and are part of only one society, distributional concerns can be effectively

34. I.R.C. § 61 (1994). The United States policy of taxing its citizens and residents on worldwide
income reflects the view that income should not be taxed differently depending on its source. See
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 170 (1938).
35. See, e.g., DAVID R. TILLINGHAsT, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONALTRANSACTIONS 3 (2d
ed. 1984) (basing the tax jurisdiction of residence and source countries on the economic benefits
conferred on the taxpayer by both governments).
36. One problem would be how to apply a progressive rate structure in these circumstanceswhether to base the rate only on the taxpayer's income from sources within the taxing jurisdiction or
on her global income. The first approach results in undertaxation and the second in overtaxation. This
is another ground for preferring residence-based taxation for individuals. See infra text accompanying
note 39. Large corporations, however, are generally taxed at a single rate. See I.R.C. § 11(a) (1994)
(providing tax rates of 34% for corporations earning between $75,000 and $10 million and 35% for
corporations earning more than $10 million).
37. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A) (1994) (applying a substantial presence test by counting the
number of days an individual is present in the United States).
38. See Ault & Bradford, supra note 32, at 30-31 (describing the difficulties in identifying a
geographical source of income).
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addressed only in'the country of residence.3 9 If the personal income tax
is to have a significant redistributive function through progressive rates, it
is necessary to include all income (including foreign source income) in the
measurement of one's ability to pay. There may be no horizontal equity
problem in taxing differently two equivalently situated taxpayers, only one
of whom invests abroad and earns low-taxed income there, as long as the
other has the same choice of investments open to her. There is, however,
a significant vertical equity problem in taxing an investor with low
domestic earnings and high foreign earnings that are not taxed abroad in
the same way that a person with only low domestic earnings is taxed.' °
This problem can be resolved if the residence jurisdiction is allowed to tax
on a residual basis only foreign source income that is not taxed abroad (or
is taxed at lower effective rates) and allows a credit for foreign taxes, but
it is much simpler to address the issue if the residence jurisdiction is given
the exclusive right to tax all income of its residents.
Third, the residence of individuals to some extent overlaps with their
political allegiance. In democratic countries, it is considered important for
individuals to have a right to participate-through their representatives-in
deciding how much tax they have to pay. The converse is even more significant: democratic legislatures have a preference for raising taxes on
foreigners precisely because they cannot vote. 4' Thus, taxation based on
residence is a useful, though far from perfect, proxy for taxation with
representation.
Finally, economists have pointed out that residence-based taxation is
compatible with the goal of capital export neutrality (CEN).42 This goal
requires that the decision to invest in a given location not be affected by
tax rates; otherwise, investments that yield the highest returns on a pretax

39. On the importance of distributional concerns in income taxation, see the classic analysis by
WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PRoGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953).

For a recommendation to use taxation as a redistributive device in preference to other methods, see
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994).
40. For a discussion of the concepts and norms of horizontal and vertical equity, see, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, HorizontalEquity: Measures in Search of a Principle,42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Paul A.
McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/KaplowExchange, 1
FLA. TAX REV. 605 (1992); and Richard A. Musgrave, HorizontalEquity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX.
1. 113 (1990).
41. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(j) (1994) (codifying the earnings stripping rule); id. § 884 (codifying
the branch profits tax).
42. CEN is generally considered by economists to be superior to capital import neutrality (CIN)
as a welfare-enhancing principle. See, e.g., Charles R. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based
DirectTaxationfor Income Taxes as the InternationalNorm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145, 146-47, 153 n.13
(1992) (explaining that CEN is needed to achieve an efficient allocation of the world's investments,
while CIN is needed for an efficient allocation of savings, which is considered to be a less important
goal); see also HUFBAUER, supranote 1, at 65-66 ("[T]he CEN approach still serves as a solid foundation for taxation of income from portfolio investments.").
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basis will not be made because the after-tax return will be lower, causing
global welfare (based on allocative efficiency) to be diminished. 4 3 In a
world with many taxing jurisdictions with varying rates, CEN is best
achieved by taxing all investors at their residence country rate.'
2. MultinationalEnterprises.-Why,then, not follow the path of pure
residence-based taxation, as suggested by Professor Green?45 There are
two major reasons. The first is that to implement full residence-based
taxation, it is necessary either to determine artificially the residence of
corporations or to impute the earnings of publicly traded MNEs to their
shareholders (the alternative supported by Professor Green). The difficulty
is that residence of corporations cannot be determined the way residence
of individuals can be and imputation of earnings to shareholders is a very
complex task, which may be administratively impossible.
The second objection to pure residence-based taxation is that it results
in more revenue being collected by developed countries and less by developing countries. To illustrate this, it is convenient to refer to a model
world made up of only three jurisdictions: a developed country (e.g., the
United States), a developing country (e.g., India), and a tax haven (e.g.,
the Cayman Islands). The residents of the United States earn active income
from the United States, earn passive income from investments in the United
States and in the Caymans, and earn passive income from investments in
X, a MNE headquartered in the United States that does business in India.
The residents of India earn active income from India, earn active income
from working for X in India, and, in the case of the elite, earn investment

43. See, e.g., HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 49 (describing the rationale and goals of CEN). But
see Daniel I. Frisch, The Economics of InternationalTax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47
TAX NOTES 581 (1990) (arguing that the CEN versus CIN debate is less relevant in a globalizing
economy).
44. See Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of InternationalInvestment Income, 94
QJ. ECON. 793, 796 (1980) ("When the combined tax on international income... equals the tax on
domestic income in the capital-exporting country... capital-exportneutrality results." (emphasis in
original)).
45. Green, supra note 1, at 70-74.
46. Id. at 72. Green recognizes that "as a practical matter, the [pure residence] approach...
would probably be feasible only if governments were to agree on a uniform definition of the corporate
income tax base." Id. For discussions of the difficulties of implementing pass-through integration for
publicly traded entities, see U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUALAND CORPORATE
TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 30-35 (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY INTEGRATION
REPORT] (rejecting pass-through integration because ofits difficulties). See also FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT, AMERICAN LAW INST., INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES,
REPORTER'S STUDYOF CORPORATETAX INTEGRATION (1993) [hereinafter ALI INTEGRATONREPORT]

(discussing the difficulties that pass-through integration raises, but proposing a framework for
implementation and recommending integration); Anthony P. Polito, A Proposalfor an Integrated
Income Tax, 12 HARv. I.L. &PUB. PoL'Y 1009,1030-48 (1989) (discounting administrative objections
to integration of the general income tax).
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income from the United States and the Caymans. X develops products in
the United States, manufactures them in India, and sells them in the United
States, but its profits are, to a large extent, channeled to investments in the
Caymans.47
In this stylized world, if all taxation were based on residence, the
United States would receive the taxes from the income of its residents
(active and passive), as well as the entire taxes from X, either because X
is headquartered there (if corporations are to have an artificial residence)
or because all of X's shareholders are residents of the United States and
none are residents of India. India, the developing country, would thus be
left only with the taxation of the local income of its residents and the
income of its elite from the United States and the Caymans, of which the
latter is difficult for India to collect. This would likely be an insufficient
amount of income for India, which would therefore refuse to cooperate in
the residence-based system.
The other extreme alternative, taxing all income on a source basis,
seems more appealing in this regard. In the simplified world, this system
would result in United States taxation of active and passive income from
the United States, including X's income from the United States, and Indian
taxation of active and passive income from India, including X's income
from India (assuming that X can be effectively taxed on a source basis).48
In comparison with a regime under which each country has the right to tax
the passive income of its residents and active income earned within its
borders, India would not lose from this arrangement, except for the taxes
it forgoes on passive income of Indian residents from the United States and
the Caymans, which are difficult for India to collect in any event.
Moreover, India would gain to the extent that portfolio income is derived
by foreign investors in India. However, as was indicated earlier, pure
source-based taxation is also unattractive. 49
None of the reasons that disfavor pure source-based taxation apply
with the same forcefulness to active business income as they do to passive
income, because much of the active income in the world is earned by
MNEs, which do not vote and are not residents of a single society.'
Moreover, CEN does not apply with the same forcefulness to MNEs as it
does to portfolio investments. Consider three reasons for this. First, much

47. See Green, supra note 1, at 46-50 (explaining the ability of MNEs to avoid taxes by "financial
maneuvering"). These methods will be discussed further infra Part Ifi.
48. For a discussion of the problems of effective source-based taxation, see infra Part In.
49. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
50. Gerald Piel, Globalopolies, 254 NATION 652 (1992) (reporting that the 350 largest transnational corporations account for one-third of the gross national product of the industrialized world and
that "[tihese increasingly stateless entities recognize the sovereignty for reasons of their own
choosing").
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of the world's international investment is now portfolio investment, and the
role of MNEs, although still growing in absolute terms, is diminishing
relative to the growth of portfolio investment. For example, in 1970,
foreign direct investment accounted for 75% of United States receipts of
foreign income; in 1990, United States receipts from foreign portfolio
investments exceeded receipts from direct investment, even though direct
investment rose from 10.8% of corporate profits in 1970 to 17.9% in
1990. 51 The same phenomenon exists for foreign portfolio investment
into the United States, which in 1990 was almost three times as high as
foreign direct investment into the United States. 2
Second, MNEs have the ability, through debt financing and transferpricing manipulation, to achieve effective CEN by lowering the rate of tax
they pay in high tax jurisdictions. It has been found that as long as MNEs
can deduct interest expense, they will expand to the point at which the
return to capital in a given country equals the global rate of interest paid
by the MNE (plus a risk premium specific to the particular country and
project) and that the combined source and residence rates of tax are
irrelevant to this decision. 3 This means that the MNE has achieved CEN
because it can make its investment decision without regard to the combined
rates of tax.
Finally, the United States debate about CEN is misguided as applied
to MNEs because it applies CEN only to MNEs whose parents happen to
be incorporated in the United States, which is increasingly a purely formal
distinction.' As Joel Slemrod writes, it would be just as significant to
tax corporations whose names begin with the letters A through K differently
than corporations whose names begin with L through Z and to forbid name
changes. 5 For true CEN to apply to MNEs, either the United States
would have to tax all MNEs on their worldwide income or all MNEs

51. HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 63.
52. Id. at 63-64.
53. Id. at 134.
54. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE

INrERUNKED ECONOMY 10 (1990) (noting that corporations that serve global markets are no longer
identified by the "nationality" or place of incorporation due to their increasing employment of foreign
workers); ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY

CAPITALISM 110, 110-18 (1991) (suggesting that the global "organizational webs of high-value
enterprise" are preventing products and goods from acquiring a national identity); Robert B. Reich,
Who is Us?, HAtv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53, 54-56 (noting that many distinctions between
United States and foreign-owned MNEs are mootbecause it is becoming more profitable for Americans
to invest in both types of enterprises); Raymond Vernon, How American is the American Corporation?,
32 (Feb. 17, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (noting the conflict
"between the requirements of a nation-state system and the realities of the multi-national enterprise").
55. JOEL B. SLEMROD, FREE TRADE TAXATION AND PROTECTIONIST TAXATION 20 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4902, 1994); see HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 5-8
("The nationality-neutral global firm is a vision for the mid-21st century, not a reality today.").
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would have to be subject to worldwide taxation by their country of resi-

dence (assuming that one country is determined uniformly to be the country
of residence); neither of these conditions is likely to be fulfilled.

The taxation of active business income by the source jurisdiction and
of passive portfolio income by the residence jurisdiction would appear to

address most of the issues identified above. The taxation of passive income
on a residence basis is congruent with the need to preserve redistribution
and representation for individuals, who earn most of this income (especially
if one ignores passive income earned by affiliated corporations), and it is
congruent with achieving CEN. As explained in Part I below, it appears
unlikely that source countries would be harmed significantly by giving up
source-based taxation of passive income earned by individuals and close

corporations.

The taxation of active income by the source country is

congruent with the need to preserve some source of revenue for the source
country, and if most such income is earned by MNEs, the arguments for
taxing it on a residence basis do not apply. Thus, it appears that the
current international consensus has significant advantages that should be
borne in mind when considering ways to simplify and modernize it.5"
II.

The Active or Passive Distinction and United States International

Taxation
This Part of the Article describes how the structure of United States
international taxation reflects the active or passive distinction and what

changes can be made by the United States unilaterally to make its regime
more congruent with the international consensus. 7 The modifications
identified in this Part should be distinguished from more profound changes
58
that can only be achieved by multilateral action.

56. The discussion below assumes that the income tax will continue to be the main direct tax, and
will not be replaced by a consumption or other type of direct tax in the foreseeable future. For an
analysis of the possibility of a shift to consumption-based taxation on an international basis, see
McLure, supra note 42. The current United States proposals to shift to consumption-based taxation
by allowing unlimited deductions for savings do not, however, significantly affect the analysis below,
because the same international issues will surface under that type of tax (an unlimited deduction for
savings and acquisition of business assets is similar to the difference in depreciation rates between the
United States and other countries that already exists, see Rob Norton, Our Screwed Up Tax Code,
FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 1993, at 34, 44 ("[Mlost [countries] also offer generous depreciation allowances
(which permit corporations to drastically reduce taxable income)."), and the deduction affects mostly
the effective rate of tax). The discussion also assumes that many countries will continue to have a
classical (unintegrated) corporate tax system. For a discussion of how the analysis fits with an
integrated tax system, see infra Part IV.
57. For survey discussions of the United States international tax regime, see ISENBERGH, supra
note 1 and KuNTZ & PERONI, supra note 1. The best summary of the regime is Ault & Bradford,
supra note 32. See also Janet G. Stotsky & Emil M. Sunley, The Tax System of the UnitedStates, 9
TAX NoTEs INT'L 1755 (1994) (providing a broad survey of domestic taxation issues and their effects
on domestic and international taxpayers).
58. For a discussion of these multilateral proposals, see infra Parts In & IV.
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The fundamental distinction underlying the United States international
tax regime is between domestic taxpayers (United States citizens, residents,
domestic corporations, partnerships, and trusts), who are taxed on their
worldwide income,59 and foreign taxpayers (all others), who are taxed
only on their United States source income.'
Domestic taxpayers are
taxed by the United States because of their personal connection to the
United States, that is, on the basis of residence; the United States does,
however, include nonresident United States citizens in this category.61

Foreign taxpayers are taxed by the United States on the basis of their
territorial connection to the United States, that is, on the basis of source.62
One problem that is raised by this distinction is that the choice between
being taxed on a residence or source basis is initially left to the taxpayer,
because corporations are classified as domestic or foreign based on their

formal place of incorporation. Therefore, it is possible for a domestic
taxpayer to shift income from residence- to source-based taxation by
routing it to a corporation incorporated abroad; if the income is foreign
source (and not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business in the United States), the result is the avoidance of current United
States taxation.' Much of the complexity of the current United States
international tax regime stems from attempts to address this problem
through antideferral regimes.'
A.

Foreign Taxpayers

The active or passive distinction is reflected in the two ways in which
the United States taxes foreign taxpayers on income derived from sources

59. I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
60. Id. §§ 871, 881-882; see also id. § 7701(b)(1)(B) (defining who is a nonresident alien
individual); id. § 7701(a)(5) (defining what is a foreign corporation and partnership). Foreign
taxpayers may also be taxed on non-United States source income, if that incomeis effectively connected
with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. See id. § 864(c)(4).
61. Id. §§ 1, 11. For the exclusion of the foreign source income of foreign taxpayers, see id.
§§ 2(d), 11(d).
62. Id. §§ 871, 881-882.
63. See id. §§ 11(d), 882(a).
64. See supra note 113 (detailing the antideferral sections in the Internal Revenue Code). All of
these sections represent various regimes created to address the problem of the choice between being
taxed on a residence or source basis being left to the taxpayer. Current simplification proposals in this
area include the Tax Simplification Act of 1993, H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-404 (1993),
which was later folded into the Tax Simplification and Technical Correctiona Act of 1993, H.R. 3419.
At least some of the simplification measures may be re-introduced in the 104th Congress as part of the
1995 budget reconciliation bill. Barbara Kirchheimer, Reconciliation to Include Simplification, Some
Extenders, Aide Says, 10 TAX NoTs INT'L 1733 (1995). See also the recent attempt by the IRS to
prevent domestic corporations from reincorporating abroad on a tax-free basis, I.R.S. Notice 94-46,
1994-1 C.B. 356, and the various proposals to impose a tax on United States citizens who expatriate,
e.g., Sam Gibbons, Gibbons Bill Would Tax Expatriates, 67 TAx NoTES 1071 (1995).
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within the United States. Income that is effectively connected with a
United States trade or business, which includes primarily active business
income, is taxed on a net basis in the same way as it would have been
taxed if earned by a domestic business.' On the other hand, "[f]ixed,
determinable, annual or periodic" income (FDAP), which includes passive
income, is nominally taxed on a gross basis at a relatively high rate
(30%),' but a combination of source rules, statutory exemptions, and tax
treaties results in such income being generally taxed only when earned by
foreign businesses as part of their active business operations 6 7 -such
income generally is not taxed when earned by portfolio investors.
1. Active Business and Effectively Connected Income.-The taxation
of active business operations in the United States is relatively straightforward. Income that is effectively connected with a United States trade
or business is taxed at the regular rates and on the same net basis as
income earned by domestic taxpayers.6" The crucial terms, "trade or
business" and "effectively connected," are not defined in the Code (with
certain exceptions),69 but a series of rulings and court cases has sought to
distinguish active business operations, which are subject to this regime,
from mere investment activity, which is not subject to it.' In particular,
since 1966, the United States generally has not treated passive earnings of
foreign businesses in the United States as subject to tax on a net basis
unless the assets or operations of the business participated in generating the
income. 7' In addition, a specific Code provision excludes investments
made through a United States broker from being treated as a trade or
business for this purpose.'
In general, the definition of effectively connected income corresponds
to the economic definition of active business income. However, effectively
connected income is in some respects broader, and in others narrower, than

65. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882 (1994).
66. Id. §§ 871(a), 881.
67. Passive income earned as part of an active business operation in the United States would be
taxed as effectively connected income rather than as FDAP. Id. § 864(c)(2).
68. Id. §§ 871(b), 882.
69. See id. § 864(b) (providing that certain limited personal services performed for a foreign
employer and certain trading in securities and commodities will not be considered a "trade or business
within the United States").
70. See, e.g., De Amodio v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 894, 903-09 (1960) (reviewing cases that
define what constitutes engaging in a United States trade or business); Lewenhaupt v. Commissioner,
20 T.C. 151, 162-63 (1953) (discussing the definition of a United States trade or business); Harvey P.
Dale, Effectively Connected Income, 42 TAX L. REV. 689 (1987) (discussing the development of the
active business terminology).
71. I.R.C. § 864(c) (1994).
72. Id. § 864(b)(2).

1996]

The Structure of International Taxation

1319

active business income from United States sources.'
First, the source
rules operate to exclude from the United States taxing jurisdiction income
that would not be subject to United States tax under the permanent establishment threshold of tax treaties. In particular, income from sales is
generally sourced according to the residence of the seller,74 and income
from sales of purchased inventory is sourced according to passage of title
(a formal attribute totally within the taxpayer's control) unless such income
is attributable to a United States office or other fixed place of business.7'
Similarly, income from international communications and from activities
in space-two of the newer additions to the source rules-is sourced according to the residence of the seller and, thus, is not subject to United
States tax if the seller is foreign unless it is attributable to a United States
office or fixed place of business.7 6 These rules reflect the international
consensus that source-based taxation of active business income should be
limited to business operations that exceed a certain minimal standard of
activity in the host country.'
In certain cases, the United States treats passive income as effectively
connected income. For example, capital gain from the sale of real property
located in the United States is treated as effectively connected income even
if the foreign investor plays an entirely passive role.78 In other cases,
income that is not clearly active or passive is treated as active. This is
true, for example, if United States source income is not effectively
connected but is also not FDAP (such as capital gains of an active United
States business from its portfolio investments). 9
2. PassiveIncome.-It is more difficult to see how the United States
follows the international consensus regarding the taxation of passive income
because the statute provides for a heavy 30% withholding tax on gross

73. See Dale, supranote 70, at 692 (noting that although the definition "loosens ... the force of
attraction rule by permitting certain types of [United States source] income to escape" tax, it "tightens
the web by including certain limited types of [foreign source] income").
74. I.R.C. § 865(a) (1994). But see id. § 865(e)(2) (providing an exception to this general rule
for inventory sold by a nonresident with an office or fixed place of business in the United States).
75. Id. §§ 861(a)(6), 865(e).
76. Id. § 863(d), (e).
77. In some cases, however, the line between active and passive foreign investors is not easy to
draw. See, e.g., De Amodio v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 894, 903-09 (1960); Lewenhaupt v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 151, 162-63 (1953); see also Linda Z. Swartz, Troubled Real Estate
Partnerships:What Options Are Available to Foreign Lenders?, 12 J. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 196,
208 (1995) (illustrating how a passive investment may cause a foreign investor to be deemed engaged
in a United States trade or business).
78. I.R.C. § 897 (1994). In addition, foreign taxpayers may treat rental and other income from
real property located within the United States as effectively connected. Id. §§ 871(d), 881(d).
79. Id. § 864(c)(3).
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passive income from United States sources.' In this case, however, it is
necessary to look beyond the basic statutory rate and to determine how
often the current regime actually imposes it. In effect, through a
combination of source rules, treaties, and statutory exemptions, few items
of income from the portfolio investments of foreign taxpayers end up being
subject to the 30% tax. In 1990, foreigners earned approximately $16
billion in passive income (including passive income of controlling shareholders), but the United States collected only about $2 billion from all its
withholding taxes together, an effective rate of only 12.5%. Approximately an additional $42 billion of passive income was exempt from tax
under the provisions described below.8 '
a. Capital Gains.-First,it should be noted that capital gains,
which are a form of passive income, have never been subject to withholding, except in the case of real property. Thus, a nonresident's gain
from the sale of stock in a United States corporation is untaxed by the
United States, even though it represents the present value of the future
stream of income from the stock.'
b. Interest.-The most prevalent exemption from the nominal
30% withholding tax is interest, which, under an exemption enacted in
1984,' is not subject to tax if earned by foreign portfolio investors."4
The exceptions to this exemption are instructive. One exception addresses
foreign banks making loans into the United States in the ordinary course
of their business, in which case the interest represents active business
income." Another exception to the portfolio interest exemption concerns
interest paid to foreign shareholders who own more than 10% of the stock
of the payer.8" This rule reflects the distinction outlined above between
active and portfolio income on the basis of control and it also provides
some deterrent against controlling shareholders' attempts to disguise
dividends as interest. Similarly, another rule restricts the application of the
exemption to contingent interest, which is similar to dividends and thus
subject to abuse in the hands of controlling shareholders.'
In addition, yet another rule restricts the deductibility of interest paid
to foreign related parties (generally, under a 50% common ownership

80. Id. §§ 871(a), 881.
81. Revisionfor the Spring 1993 Issue, IRS STATS. INCOME BULL., Fall 1994, at 7 (Table: Forms

1042s).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See I.R.C. § 865(a)(2) (1994).
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127, 98 Stat. 494, 648.
I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (1994).
Id. § 881(c)(3)(A).
Id. §§ 871(h)(3), 881(c)(3)(B).
Id. §§ 871(h)(4), 881(c)(4).
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threshold) if the payer's debt-to-equity ratio is too high.8" This "earnings
stripping" rule is also designed to backstop the interest or dividends
distinction and to prevent too high a percentage of United States business
profits from being paid out as deductible interest to controlling shareholders. The combination of the 10% stock ownership limit on the portfolio interest exception and the limits on deductibility keeps a foreign
enterprise engaged in an active business operation in the United States
through a subsidiary from escaping United States tax by paying interest that
is not subject to withholding and that reduces the profits of the subsidiary,
although that result can still be achieved by financing the subsidiary from
an unrelated foreign entity (as long as it is not a "bank").89 The emphasis
on related parties in both the earnings stripping rule and the 10% stock
ownership exception reflects the sense that a related foreign party is really
engaged in active business in the United States through its control of its
subsidiary, and that the interest income it receives represents more than
purely passive income. Thus, these rules run contrary to the formal
distinction between the foreign parent and the subsidiary-the internationally accepted definition of a permanent establishment excludes a
parent from being treated as engaged in an active business in a country
merely because it controls a subsidiary -but the rules are congruent with
a view that restricts passive income to portfolio income.
c. Dividends.-The situation in the case of dividends is more
complicated. Unlike interest, which is not subject to withholding under the
United States Model Treaty, dividends are subject to taxation at their
source (at 5% or 15%, depending on whether or not they are paid to
shareholders owning 10% of the payer or not) even if a treaty is in
place.9' Second, dividends are subject to potential triple taxation: they
are not deductible to the payer, they are subject to withholding, and they
are potentially subject to tax in the hands of the recipient (with no foreign
tax credit or exemption if, for example, they are treated as domestic source
dividends under a foreign country's source rules, which frequently are less
formalistic than the residence of the payer rule followed by the United

88. Id. § 163(1).
89. If the subsidiary is financed from an unrelated foreign entity, the earnings stripping rule will
not apply because the entity is unrelated, and the portfolio interest exception will apply because the
entity is unrelated and is not a bank. See id. §§ 163(j)(3), 871(h), 882(c). Therefore, interest payments will reduce the United States tax base and will not be subject to withholding.
90. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 5(7) ("The fact that a company [in one
country] . . . controls or is controlled by a company [in another country] ... shall not of itself
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.").
91. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 10(2). The threshold is 25% under the OECD
Model Treaty. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 10(2).
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States).'
Thus, dividends are a tax-inefficient way of repatriating the
earnings of United States corporations.
Nevertheless, even in the case of dividends, certain rules operate to
reduce the likelihood that portfolio dividends will be subject to effective
source-based taxation. First, the 30% withholding tax on portfolio
dividends is relatively easy to avoid because of an administrative rule,
which provides that payers should withhold tax on dividends based on the
address to which the dividend is sent, without any certification as to the
actual residence of the recipient.'
This rule means that portfolio
investors (but not easily traceable direct investors) can avoid withholding
at the 30 % rate by directing their dividends to an address in a country with
a favorable treaty rate with the United States.'
Second, the source rule for dividends, like the rule for interest, is
formalistic: dividends are sourced according to the residence of the
payer.9' In the absence of other rules, this would mean that a foreign
corporation whose entire income is effectively connected with its United
States trade or business could pay dividends to foreign shareholders without
withholding tax being imposed. In fact, however, the source rule has been
modified to make such dividends United States source income in certain
cases;' but in practice, the Treasury Department has found it impossible
to enforce withholding on dividends paid by a foreign corporation to
foreign shareholders' and is forbidden from doing so by many United
States treaties.98 To counteract this result, Congress in 1986 enacted the
branch profits tax, which seeks to impose an equivalent tax on the earnings
of the foreign corporation that are withdrawn from its United States trade
or business.' Although the branch profits tax operates as a replacement
for withholding on dividends (and interest) paid by the foreign corporation
from its United States business, it should be noted that unlike a withholding
92. See, e.g., Income and CorporationTaxAct, 1988, ch. 1, § 2461 (U.K.) (incorporating a 1994
law that determines the source of dividends with reference to the source of the underlying profits, rather
than residence of the payer).
93. Treasury Regulations specify the forms of income for which such certification is required;
dividends are specifically excluded. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-6(a) (1984). The Treasury Departmenthas
been unable to change this rule, despite repeated efforts. See John K. McNulty, CorporateIncome Tax
Reform in the United States: Proposalsfor Integrationof the CorporateandIndividualIncome Taxes,
and InternationalAspects, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 161, 241 (1994).
94. The Treasury Department intends to issue proposed regulations that will require the dividend
recipient to certify that he is a resident of a treaty country in order to benefit from the reduced treaty
rate of withholding. See John Turro, Reforming Withholding Tax Rules for ForeignInvestors, 66 TAX
NOTES 1604, 1604 (1995) (discussing concerns about the possible institution of global certification
procedures).
95. I.R.C. § 861(a)(2) (1994).
96. Id. § 861(a)(2)(B).
97. Norman Sternlicht, Inequality After the BranchProfits Tax, 14 INT'L TAX 1. 245, 245 (1988).
98. E.g., U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 10(5).
99. I.R.C. § 884 (1994).
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tax on dividends, the branch profits tax is an additional tax on the corporation engaged in an active United States business, which may or may not be
passed on to the passive investors in that corporation. In addition, the
United States has agreed with many of its treaty partners to refrain from
imposing the branch profits tax on corporations resident in the other country, and in fact, the United States collects very little revenue from the
tax. 00
Finally, in many cases, dividends can be disguised as interest, with
respect to which small investors can take advantage of the portfolio interest
exemption. Although the 1993 Tax Act reduced the size of this loophole,
it still exists, for example, in the case of interest based on the value of
publicly traded stock. 1° ' The combination of opportunities for avoidance
described above means that dividend withholding is infrequent for portfolio
investors.
d. Rents and Royalties.-The withholding tax on royalties and
rents is slightly harder to avoid than the tax on dividends or interest
because the source rule is less formalistic and more reflective of economic
reality. Royalties and rents are sourced according to the place where the
asset that gives rise to them is used."m However, the United States, like
most industrialized countries, negotiates for a 0 % withholding rate on rents
and royalties in its tax treaties."l° Moreover, even in the absence of a
treaty, companies can frequently recharacterize royalties as sale proceeds
or as income from services,"t 4 and in both cases, favorable source rules
exist that allow taxpayers to avoid United States withholding taxes
altogether.' 5
To sum up, the taxation of foreign taxpayers generally follows the
active or passive distinction. Active income-income effectively connected
with a United States trade or business-is subject to United States tax at its
source. Passive FDAP income is nominally subject to withholding taxes,

100. See I.R.S. Notice 87-56, 1987-2 C.13. 367 (listing treaty partners for which the United States
will not apply the branch profits tax).
101. I.R.C. § 871(h)(4)(C)(v)(I) (1994).
102. Id. § 861(a)(4).
103. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 12; cf. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art.
12 (1) ("Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State
shall be taxable only in that other state if such resident is the beneficial owner of the royalties.").
104. See, e.g., Commissionerv. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 392 (1949) (discussing the statutory
distinction between royalties, which were subject to withholding tax, and gains from the sale of
property, which were not); Karrer v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 66, 71-72 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (allowing
a taxpayer to successfully characterize payments that appearedto be royalties as income from services).
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-11 (1984). In addition, income from interest rate swaps and other
types of swaps is sourced in the country of the recipient. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b)(1) (1984). Since
swaps can provide adequate substitutes for interest or dividends, this adds another loophole to the
withholding regime.
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but because of the operation of statutory rules (e.g., the portfolio interest
exemption), source rules (e.g., the formal rules for sourcing dividends,
interest, and wages), regulatory rules (e.g., the address rule for dividend
withholding), and treaties (e.g., the 0% rate on interest and royalties), the
United States frequently does not tax such income in the hands of portfolio
investors.
Commentators have suggested that the 30 % United States withholding
rate is too high because it reflects an attempt to tax income at net rates of
between 70% and 90%.1' In fact, the refusal to lower the rate when net
United States tax rates were lowered in 1986 may reflect Congress's recognition that the withholding regime is filled with loopholes and that the 30 %
rate is rarely imposed upon portfolio investors but that it is a useful
bargaining chip in treaty negotiations. However, if the proper United
States policy is not to tax passive income at its source, this can be achieved
in simpler ways than the hodgepodge of rules and exceptions outlined
above."7
B. Domestic Taxpayers
Domestic United States taxpayers are taxed on their worldwide
income, but a foreign tax credit is given for foreign income taxes on
foreign source income up to the United States tax rate. 108 This suggests
that the United States policy is to give the source country primary tax
jurisdiction over all types of income. Although this is true to some
extent,"° a combination of statutory rules results in passive foreign
income being treated far less favorably than active foreign income, so that
in practice, the United States is more likely to respect the primary right of
the foreign jurisdiction to tax active income than passive income.
1. Deferral.-Thefirst distinction between active and passive income
involves deferral. The possibility of deferring current United States tax on
foreign source income results from the fact that only domestic taxpayers
are taxed on their worldwide income"0 and that taxpayers can easily
choose between classification as foreign or domestic according to the

106. See, e.g., ZeevHolender& Alan I. Appel, The U.S.-Israel Treaty, Bearing Two Protocols,
Moves Toward Ratification, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 292 (1993) (describing the 30% withholding tax as
"high"); Conversation with David Rosenbloom, former United States International Tax Counsel (Oct.
15, 1994).
107. For a suggestion on a simplification of the United States regime, see infra subpart11(C).
108. I.R.C. §§ 901, 904 (1994).
109. See Green, supra note 1, at 74 ("Under the current international tax norms... the United
States must yield primary tax jurisdiction to source countries.").
110. I.R.C. §§ 11(d), 881-882 (1994).
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formal jurisdiction of their incorporation.11' If only these rules applied,
a taxpayer could defer current United States tax on foreign source income
simply by routing it to a subsidiary incorporated abroad. If the subsidiary
were incorporated in a tax haven, the result would be no current taxation
of the foreign source income of the subsidiary, which is equivalent to a tax
exemption for the interest on these earnings for the period of deferral. 2
This would amount to virtually complete exemption in present value terms
if the deferral lasts long enough.
Such favorable treatment of foreign source income would encourage
United States taxpayers to route their income to foreign "incorporated
pocketbooks." To counter this tendency, the United States has a complex
set of overlapping antideferral regimes, all of which result either in current
taxation of the foreign source income to controlling United States shareholders or in an interest charge on the income when it is repatriated to the
United States. 3 The earliest of these regimes, dating from 1937,
applied only to foreign corporations controlled by five or fewer United
States individuals.114 In 1962, the antideferral mechanism was applied
to foreign corporations controlled by United States corporate as well as
individual shareholders, 15 and in 1986, it was extended to all United
States shareholders of foreign corporations, even if they only hold a
minuscule percentage of the shares. 6
It should be noted, however, that the common feature of all of these
regimes, as well as of a currently-proposed, simplified regime uniting most
of them, 1" is that they only apply to passive foreign income. In 1962,
the original Kennedy administration proposal for eliminating deferral on all
the foreign earnings of controlled foreign corporations was defeated," 8
as were similar proposals in the 1970s. Most recently, in 1992, a similar
proposal by former-Congressman Dan Rostenkowski was also met with
little enthusiasm, and no movement in this direction seems to be likely."9
111. Id. § 7701 (a) (4), (5).
112. WILUAM D. ANDRBwS, BAsIc FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 263 (4th ed. 1991).
113. See I.R.C. §§ 551-558 (1994) (composingwhat is referred to as the foreign personal holding
corporation regime); see id. §§ 951-60 (composing what is referred to as the "subpart F" regime); id.
§§ 1291-1297 (composing the passive foreign investment company regime); see also id. §§ 541-547
(composing what is called the personal holding corporation regime, which applies to foreign corporations under some circumstances); id. §§ 531-537 (creating the accumulated earnings tax, which also
applies to foreign corporations).
114. Id. § 5 52(a)(2).
115. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1006.
116. Id. §§ 1291-1297 (composing the passive foreign investment company regime); see also id.
§§ 1246-1247 (governing "foreign investment companies").
117. See H.R. 13, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-404 (1993) (proposing a unified "passiveforeign
corporation" regime to supplant all
of the aforementioned regimes except subpart F).
118. See PiccIOTTO, supra note 1, at 111-12.
119. Cf.H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1992) (proposing the repeal of tax deferral for
controlled foreign corporations).
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Instead, the 1993 Tax Act contained an expansion of subpart F, which
applied it to passive income generating assets of controlled foreign
corporations."ro
Despite the rhetoric surrounding this measure as
intended to combat the migration of United States manufacturing jobs
overseas, the predictable response was an increase in the investment of
controlled foreign corporations in their active foreign businesses but no
diminution in deferral."
The result of this combination of regimes is that active foreign income
enjoys a privileged position over passive foreign income. Although passive
foreign income may be taxed currently even to noncontrolling United States
shareholders, most active foreign income is not, even if the active income
is not currently taxed overseas. Thus, the United States unilaterally grants
the source jurisdiction the primary right to tax active income and does not
assert residual jurisdiction even if the foreign country does not exercise that
right, as long as the income stays abroad; but it asserts its residence
jurisdiction to tax currently passive foreign income, albeit with a foreign
tax credit (up to the United States tax rate) to avoid double taxation of that
income."
2. Foreign Tax Credit.-A second significant distinction in favor of
source-based taxation of active foreign income involves the operation of the
foreign tax credit. As revised in 1986, the limitation on the credit (by
which the credit is limited to the United States tax rate on foreign source
income) is further limited by applying it separately by categories of income
("baskets")." z In particular, several categories of passive income are
segregated from each other, so that high foreign taxes on one type of
passive income cannot be averaged with low foreign taxes on another type
of passive foreign income." For example, if Germany imposes a high
withholding tax on interest and India does not, these two categories of
income are segregated into separate baskets and cannot be combined to
bring the average foreign tax below the limitation."z This means that if

120. I.R.C. § 956A (1994).
121. See John M. Peterson, Jr. et al., A Passive-Aggressive Approach to Anti-Deferral in the
1990s: Oitical Analysis andPlanning Techniques Under Section 956A, 72 TAXES 1084, 1108 (1994)
("Section 956A actually provides a stronger incentive to reinvest such profits outside the United States
in active businesses. . . ." (emphasis omitted)); Philip A. Stoffregen& Stewart R. Lipeles, The Impact
of Section 956A and Related Legislative Changes on U.S Multinationals, 63 TAX NoTEs 751, 759
(1994) ("Section 956A ... may cause U.S. multinationals in the aggregate to increase their foreign
holdings instead of repatriating the accumulated earnings of existing CFCs.").
122. I.R.C. § 901(a) (1994) (allowing United States taxpayers a credit against taxes of foreign
countries and of possessions of the United States).
123. Id. § 904(d).
124. Id. (creating separate basket limitations for certain categories of income, including high
withholding tax interest and various types of dividends).
125. Id. § 904(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B) (creating and defining, respectively, a separate limitation
category for "high withholding tax interest"). In the recent United States tax treaty with Mexico, the
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the high withholding tax on the gross interest from Germany translates into
a rate on the net interest income that is higher than the United States rate,
the excess foreign taxes cannot be credited, resulting in a permanent bias
against such investments. Similarly, dividends from each foreign corporation in which the taxpayer controls between 10% and 50% of the shares are
segregated, so that high withholding taxes on such dividends from one
country cannot be averaged with low withholding taxes on dividends from
a different country, such as a treaty partner of the United States. 12
The exception to this "basket" system is active foreign source income,
which is all lumped into one residual category." This means that high
foreign taxes on active income can usually be credited in full if the United
States corporation can find a low-taxed source of active foreign income.
For example, suppose that United States corporation Xhas $100 in United
States source income and $100 in foreign source income from Germany,
which is subject to a German tax rate of 50 %. In that case, X will end up
with a high effective tax rate and $15 of excess foreign tax credits: X's
foreign tax credit will be limited to $35 (35 % [the United States tax rate]
x $100 [X's foreign source income]); X's United States tax liability will be
$35 (35 % x $200 [worldwide income] = $70 [tentative United States tax] $35 [foreign tax credit allowed by the limitation]); X's total worldwide tax
liability will be $85 ($50 [German tax liability] + $35 [United States tax
liability]), an effective tax rate of 42.5%; and X will have $15 of excess
foreign tax credits ($50 [foreign tax liability] - $35 [United States foreign
tax credit])."
If X can in this situation find a foreign country which
does not tax active income (e.g., Ireland, which grants tax holidays to
foreign investors), 2 9 and from which it can earn an additional $100 of
foreign source income, its effective tax rate will be dramatically lower: X
can credit the entire amount of foreign taxes paid (35 % [the United States
tax rate] x $200 [X's foreign source income] = $70 [United States foreign
tax credit limit], which is greater than X's total foreign tax liability of $50);
X's United States tax liability will be $55 (35% x $300 [worldwide
rate of withholding on interest is set at 4.9%, in order to avoid this limitation. Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Income Taxes,
Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 11, S. TREATY DOc. No. 103-07, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter Mexico Treaty].
126. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(E), (d)(2)(E) (1994) (creating a separate credit limitation category for
certain dividends from controlled corporations). For an impressive defense of this complex system,
see Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax CreditandIts Critics, 9 AM. 1. TAx POL'Y 1, 57 (1991) (concluding that despite minor technical flaws, the credit "embodies skill and principle in the face of
significant pressure").
127. I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(1) (1994).
128. See id. § 904(a) (setting forth the general formula for the foreign tax credit limitation).
129. See ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., TAx AND TRADE GUIDE: REPUBuC OF IRELAND 161-62
(1972) (noting that financial inducements to attract foreign industrialists include "[e]xemptions from
Irish income taxes").
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income] = $105 [tentative United States tax] - $50 [United States foreign
tax credit]); X's total worldwide tax liability will be $105 ($50 [German tax
liability] + $55 [United States tax liability]), an effective tax rate of 35%
or 7.5% less than before. 13°
This ability to average active foreign income from several sources for
foreign tax credit limitation purposes gives a significant incentive to United
States taxpayers who operate abroad to invest in foreign jurisdictions that
levy low effective tax rates on the taxpayers' active business income
because this will enable them to credit the often higher foreign taxes
imposed on business operations in other countries.
To sum up, active foreign business income of domestic taxpayers is
not taxed by the United States currently if earned through a foreign subsidiary until it is distributed to the United States taxpayer (as a dividend,
interest, or even as a loan),"' even if there is no source-based taxation.
Moreover, even when it is distributed, such active income retains a privileged position because the averaging rules generally allow a credit against
all foreign taxes on such income, so that the United States will rarely levy
even residual taxes on this income. Passive foreign income, on the other
hand, is taxed currently (or is subjected to an interest charge),13 and
taxpayers are discouraged from investing such income in countries imposing high taxes at the income's source by effectively denying a foreign tax
credit for such taxes by segregating them into separate baskets. As a
result, the United States most often will get to tax such passive income
currently and in full. While the United States retains the residual right to
tax active income as the residence country and recognizes the primary right
of other countries to tax passive income at its source, these rules promoteas the international consensus would indicate-source taxation of active
income and residence taxation of passive income, even in the absence of
a tax treaty with the United States.
C. Alternatives to Current United States Rules
The current United States international tax system is congruent with
the active or passive distinction in some respects but not in others. In
particular, the nominally high rate of withholding tax imposed on foreign
taxpayers deriving some types of passive income from United States
sources is incongruent with the international consensus and with other tax
130. Because of this phenomenon, the refusal of the United States to grant "tax sparing" credits
(i.e., to credit taxes nominally payable to a foreign country, but forgiven under a tax holiday) is much
less injurious to United States based MNs than might otherwise appear to be the case.

131. See I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(1)(B), 956(b)(1)(B) (1994) (providingthat a United States shareholder
must include in income a pro rata share of the increase in obligations owed by United States shareholders to a controlled foreign corporation).
132. See id. § 1291 (imposing an interest charge on certain passive income on which taxes have
been deferred).
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rules, and it causes much of the complexity within the system. In addition,
the foreign tax credit rules are immensely complicated because the United
States grants credits for foreign taxes on passive income, despite the
primacy of residence taxation on such income under the international
consensus described above.
Before describing some simplification measures that can be adopted
unilaterally in the context of the passive or active distinction, it is useful
to consider whether the United States should continue to observe this
distinction or whether it should move unilaterally in the direction of
maximizing revenues by: (a) ending deferral for foreign source active
business income of United States taxpayers (and their controlled foreign
subsidiaries); and (b) imposing source-based taxation on all income that is
sourced in the United States under economically based (rather than formalistic) source rules.133 Both of these suggestions have been made by
academic commentators and have found some support in Congress in the
current deficit conscious era.
1. Ending Deferral.-Endingdeferral for active foreign income has
been proposed many times, both as a way of preserving CEN and as a
revenue raising measure." True CEN would, as explained above, require
taxing all foreign corporations on their worldwide income, and it is
doubtful whether even that extreme step would enhance efficiency.
Moreover, ending deferral would not raise significant revenue. First, since
1986, a high proportion of active business income has been taxed abroad
at rates as high or higher than the United States rate, 3 ' and many United
States corporations thus find themselves in an excess credit situation;
ending deferral while granting foreign tax credits would not lead to greater
United States revenues in those cases. Second, ending deferral would
require the United States to end deferral for foreign source losses as
well. 35 For these reasons, the most recent proposal to end all deferral
was scored to raise only $200 million by the revenue estimators.' 37
133. See, e.g., Edrey, supra note 24.
134. E.g., H.R. 5270, supra note 119; see also Asim Bhansali, Note, Globalizing Consolidated
Taxation of United States Multinationals,74 TEIx. L. REV. 1401, 1407-15 (1996) (proposing an end
to deferral that would be achieved through consolidated taxation of United States parent corporations
and their foreign subsidiaries).
135. Virginia M. Turis, Foreign Tax Credit: Limitation After Tax Reform Act: The Separate
Limitation Categoriesand the Application ofthe Look-Through Rule, 42 TAX LAW. 275, 277 (1989).
136. Paul W. Oosterhuis & Roseann M. Cutrone, The Cost of Deferral's Repeal: If Done
Properly,It Loses Billions, 58 TAx NoTES 765, 768 (1993) (concluding that in order to follow the
economic policy underpinnings for eliminating deferral, United States companies must be given a
realistic opportunity to elect to include their foreign subsidiaries in their consolidated group for United
States income tax purposes).
137. See Lee Sheppard, Deferral,Runaway Plants, and CapitalAllocation, 59 TAx NOTES 999,
1002 (1993) (referring to the estimated $200 million revenue gain from a Clinton administration
proposal to repeal deferral).
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In addition, the current proposals to end deferral apply only to
controlled foreign corporations. However, to seriously combat deferral
from a purely United States perspective-even assuming that only corporations controlled by United States persons should be affected-current
United States taxation should apply to all income earned through foreign
corporations, controlled or uncontrolled, passive or active. Because a
United States shareholder has no way of making a noncontrolled foreign
corporation distribute its income to her, the regime would have to include
an option to pay the tax with an interest charge when the earnings are
distributed, similar to the current PFIC regime."' However, even that
option imposes a heavy burden on the taxpayer, who may have difficulty
making a foreign corporation in which she owns only a minuscule percentage of shares disclose the information necessary for a tax return. It is
doubtful whether ending deferral is worth that burden.
2. Taxing All Income EconomicallyDerivedfrom the United States.Levying United States tax on all income that derives economically from the
United States faces far more significant obstacles than ending deferral.
First, it would require unilaterally levying withholding taxes on portfolio
interest (including bank deposits), which would either deter foreign
investors from placing their mobile capital in the United States or require
raising interest rates to preserve foreign investors' after-tax return.139
Second, it would require drastic changes to the source rules, so that
dividends or interest would be sourced not according to the formal residence of the payer, but according to the level of the payer's economic
activity in the United States. These changes in the source rules are
complicated and very difficult to administer because the proper withholding
would be on payments from foreign entities to foreign recipients. The
branch profits tax, which currently substitutes for such withholding for
dividends, is an inadequate proxy because it falls on the wrong taxpayer
and because it is extremely complicated to administer."4
138. I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297 (1994). For critiques of the complexity of the PFIC regime, see, e.g.,
David R. Tillinghast, InternationalTax Simplification, 8 AM. 1. TAx POL'Y 187, 204-05 (1990) and
StephenE. Shay, The Post-TAMRA Treatment of U.S. ShareholdersofPFICs(pts. 1 & 2), 70 1. TAX'N
296, 374 (1989).
139. See HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 66 (explaining that "a tax on interest paid to foreigners will
prompt these tax-sensitive investors to withdraw funds until market forces push the domestic interest
rate up by enough to offset the tax").
140. Commentators have been critical of the branch profits tax for other reasons as well. See,
e.g., Fred B. Brown, FederalIncome Taxation of U.S. Branchesof Foreign Corporations:Separate
Entity or SeparateRules?, 49 TAX L. REV. 133, 195-96 (1993) (criticizing the branch profits tax as
an example of the unwarranted disparity in tax treatment of United States subsidiaries of foreign
corporations and United States branches of foreign corporations); Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative
Override ofIncome Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and CongressionalArrogation ofAuthority,
42 TAX LAW. 173, 181, 201 (1989) (arguing that the enactment of the branch profits tax overrides
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In the absence of such changes, however, the current rules place an
immense premium on whether payments are characterized as dividends
(and subject to withholding tax) or portfolio interest (and exempt) and on
whether they are royalties (generally taxable) or income from sales or
services (generally not taxable because of the source rules). These

distinctions require constant policing, and much of the complexity of the
inbound rules of the Code stems from this problem.141 In particular, the

various limitations on the portfolio interest exemption derive primarily
from the need to distinguish dividends from interest, and significant
litigation and uncertainty surrounds the distinction between royalties and
sales or services. 142
It would appear, therefore, that instead of attempting to enforce the
unenforceable, considerable simplification and greater consistency could be
achieved if the United States were unilaterally to adopt two complementary
and symmetrical changes in its international tax regime: abandoning the
taxation of United States source portfolio income (including dividends) and

ending the foreign tax credit for foreign source portfolio income.'
3.

Ending Source-Based Taxation of Portfolio Income.-Ending

source-based taxation of portfolio income of foreign taxpayers would have

numerous benefits. This proposal would enable the United States to
simplify considerably its tax rules relating to inbound investment: the
contingent debt limitation on the portfolio interest exception could be lifted
because it is designed to prevent the avoidance of the withholding tax on
dividends.'" Similarly, the branch profits tax, which is designed as a
substitute for withholding on dividends, could be abandoned.'
The
source rules relating to inbound investment would be maintained because

existing treaty nondiscrimination provisions and that this override constitutes a violation of international
law by the United States); Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, FinalBranch RegulationsFailto Clear
the Thicket of Complexity, 78 J. TAx'N 110, 117 (1993) ("IFlor the typical foreign corporation [the
rules] leave the computation of branch taxes entwined in a thicket of complexity."). The original
revenue estimate for the branch profits tax totalled a modest $110 million over five years. GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 1047 (1986).
141. See Brown, supra note 140, at 185-86 (proposing that the "nebulous standard" for
determining the status of investment income, which has "engendered a considerable number of disputes
between taxpayers and the Service," be replaced by an elective system for administrative simplification
purposes).
142. See, e.g., Commissionerv. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949) (holding that incometo a nonresident alien for royalties for copyrights used in the United States is subject to United States tax);
Karrer v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 66, 73 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (holding that payments to a non-resident
alien for services performed outside the United States are not subject to United States tax).
143. See HUFAUER, supra note 1, at 66-67 ("[Countries should] fully tax income received by
their own residents from international portfolio investments. At the same time, they should not tax
interest income paid to foreign investors.").
144. I.R.C. § 871(h)(4) (1994).
145. Id. § 884.
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they are needed to enforce taxation on direct investment, but the pressure
of determining the source of portfolio income would be significantly
lowered by a rule stating that the income of foreign taxpayers is not from
United States sources unless it is either effectively connected with a United
States trade or business or derived from a 10% or more controlled United
States subsidiary. This rule would make it less important to distinguish
among categories of passive income and exclude from taxation those
taxpayers not engaged (directly or indirectly) in a United States trade or
business. The sourcing of active business income of those taxpayers
engaged in a United States trade or business would have to be addressed
by other means.'
The limitation of this proposal to portfolio income may seem
incongruent with the international consensus to the extent that the
consensus requires that all passive income (and not just portfolio income)
be taxed on a residence basis. However, in the absence of such a limitation, it is doubtful whether the United States can under the current rules
effectively enforce source-based taxation of active income because of the
difficulties in enforcing transfer pricing.'4 7 In the absence of an
international consensus on transfer pricing, it would seem necessary to
maintain withholding taxes on passive income distributed to foreign direct
investors and on passive income effectively connected with a United States
trade or business in order to ensure that some tax is levied on United States
source active business income. For the same reason, the earnings stripping
rule needs to be retained.'
However, more than half of all foreign
investment in the United States would be freed from withholding taxes
under the proposed rule. 4 9
There are two main objections to unilaterally abolishing the withholding tax on portfolio FDAP income. The first is the loss of revenue,
but this will be relatively small (about $2 billion per year under the current
system) and will be offset by the savings produced (both for the IRS and
for taxpayers) by the simplification entailed in abolishing withholding and
by the revenue raised by the abolition of the foreign tax credit for foreign
withholding taxes on portfolio income." 5 The second objection, which
is potentially more serious, is that there would be no incentive for other
nations to enter into tax treaties with the United States and reduce their

146. See discussion infra Part m'1.
147. See discussion infra Part II.
148. I.R.C. § 163(j) (1994).
149. HuFBAuER, supra note 1, at 63-64.
150. Id. at 71-76. Hufbauer estimates the combined effect of abolishing withholding on inbound
portfolio investment and granting only a deduction, but no credit, on taxes on outbound portfolio
investment as a revenue gain of $12 billion, without even taking into consideration the administrative
savings. Id.
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withholding taxes unless the United States had withholding taxes, that it
could reciprocally reduce."' However, this objection ignores the reality
that few countries are today in need of reducing United States source
taxation on the passive income of their residents. Developed countries,
whose residents invest heavily in the United States, already benefit from
low or no United States source-based taxation of passive income under
existing treaties and generally renegotiate those treaties not to achieve
further reductions in source-based taxation but to redefine the scope of the
treaty in other ways, such as the definition of a permanent establishment
or the exchange of information article. The abolition of residual United
States withholding taxes would not significantly affect the incentives of
those countries to renegotiate their treaties. Developing countries, which
generally have no treaty with the United States, 5 ' generally also do not
have significant investments by their residents in the United States. 53 To
the extent they do, these investments represent capital flight, which is
encouraged by the portfolio interest exemption and is not viewed favorably
by the developing countries.)" Such countries would be interested in
treaties with the United States to benefit from the exchange of information
and to encourage United States investment by ensuring the creditability of
their taxes and by defining what constitutes a permanent establishment.
Thus, it would seem that few countries today would negotiate treaties with
the United States primarily to obtain a reduction of United States withholding taxes.
4. Eliminatingthe Foreign Tax Creditfor Foreign-SourcePortfolio
Income.-The second proposal involves simplification of the foreign tax
credit mechanism by granting the credit only for taxes on active income,
plus withholding taxes on passive income representing distributions by
foreign corporations to significant United States direct investors (e.g., to
shareholders who own 10% or more of a corporation's stock), but denying
credit for foreign withholding taxes on portfolio income and allowing only
a deduction for those taxes.
The result of these changes would be the abandonment of the basket
system. All active income, as well as all passive income from 10% or
more controlled foreign corporations, would be given a foreign tax credit

151. Hufbauer does not discuss this issue, suggesting only that the denial of the credit be phased
in gradually to allow for renegotiating treaties. Id. at 67.
152. Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury: The "Enhancement" of S 163(J) and the Tax
Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 304 n.68 (1994).
153. Id.
154. Cf. id. at 67 n.9 (noting that the rule adopted by some developing countries that exempts
from tax the income of residents from foreign investments has played a "troublesome" role with regard
to capital flight).
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with an overall limitation. All other income would not receive a foreign
tax credit; instead, the foreign taxes would be deductible as a business or
investment expense. This proposal would only be implemented in the
absence of a treaty requirement to credit low foreign withholding taxes, but
United States treaty policy should seek to persuade foreign countries to
abandon their residual withholding taxes on portfolio income in the treaty
context. 155
The rationales for this proposal-other than its simplification
potential-are that the United States should not credit foreign taxes on
income on which it has the first right to levy tax under the international
consensus and that source countries will not be harmed if the United States
does so. In today's mobile capital markets, there is already considerable
pressure to reduce withholding taxes on passive portfolio income; a refusal
to credit such taxes would further contribute to their reduction.156
Economists have long argued that the burden of taxing mobile capital from
abroad by source countries falls on the source country, because foreign
investors would refuse to lend unless their yield was raised to cover the
withholding tax; thus, investments with a lower yield would not be made,
even though they would be profitable on a pretax basis. 57 For example,
if a 20% withholding tax is imposed and foreign investors can obtain a
10% after-tax yield elsewhere, the source country yield would have to be
12.5% to give the foreign investors a net yield of 10%. The foreign
investors will not be harmed, but domestic investments (of equivalent risk
and maturity) with a yield of less than 12.5% will not be made, even if
they would have been made if no tax were imposed. Because the need to
pay higher yields to foreign investors leads to artificially high returns for
domestic investors, a loss of welfare for the source country results." 8
This result does not necessarily occur in the presence of a foreign tax
credit because foreign investors will not be harmed by the 20% tax if they

155. See id. at 67 (suggesting that the United States terminate existing treaties in a gradual
fashion).
156. Cf. HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 68 (stating that denial of a United States foreign tax credit
for portfolio income would begin a chain of events that would lead to repeal of foreign withholding
taxes on such income).
157. See Mark Gersovitz, The Effects of Domestic Taxes on Foreign PrivateInvestment, in THE
THEORY OF TAXATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 615, 616-18 (David Newberry & Nicholas Stem
eds., 1987) (explaining that under a set of certain assumptions, any tax on foreign capital will be borne
entirely by the source country because any increase in tax will result in a corresponding decrease in
capital investment); Chang H. Lee, Toward a Small Country Theory of Designing an In-bound Income
Tax System and Interpreting Tax Treaties, ch. 7, at 1-3 (1992) (unpublished SJ.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School) (concluding that a developing country should exempt foreign capital from tax,
except to the extent host country taxes would be creditable against taxes of the investor's home
country).
158. HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 66 (explaining that when interest rates are pushed up to offset
taxes "the end result will be a loss for the capital-importing country, because some profitable
investment opportunities will be forgone").
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can obtain a credit for the tax against their domestic tax liability.
However, significant numbers of investors either are tax exempt or have
excess credits on passive income and therefore cannot use the credits under
the current rules.159 In those circumstances, abolishing the credit would

not harm the source country more than the current situation does.
Moreover, the unavailability of a credit would discourage investment in
countries with withholding taxes and, in turn, encourage those countries to
eliminate harmful withholding taxes.
Although abolishing the credit for portfolio income may create a
certain amount of international double taxation, the amount is unlikely to
be high, given the mobility of capital investment. In addition, the burden
would be mitigated by the deductibility of the foreign tax, and it would
seem likely that the simplification potential and transaction costs saved by
abolishing the basket system outweigh the disadvantage to foreign portfolio
investment. 1" It should be noted that this proposal does not extend to
foreign withholding taxes on direct investment because these taxes represent the only efficient way for many developing countries to tax foreign
direct investment. Thus, the treatment under the two proposals for inbound
and outbound investment would be parallel: there will be no United States
withholding tax on inbound portfolio investment, and there will be no
United States credit for foreign withholding taxes on outbound portfolio
investment, while both withholding taxes and credits will be maintained for
direct investment.
A more radical proposal would entail abolishing the foreign tax credit
altogether, granting an exemption to foreign active income, and taxing
foreign passive income on a worldwide basis with no credit. This result
may already be achieved under the current system to a large extent.
Because corporations have the ability to average high and low tax rates on
active foreign income, it is relatively rare for residual United States tax to
be levied on such income. The exemption for foreign source active income
would benefit developing countries and act as a substitute for the tax
sparing credit the United States has been unwilling to grant."' However,

159. Some have suggested that small countries should impose inbound withholding taxes only
when a credit is actually available to the foreign investor. Lee, supra note 157. But this may adversely
affect the creditability of the tax. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(c) (as amended 1991) (denying
credit for such "soak-up" taxes).
160. See HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at68 (predictingthat theeffect of such unilateral United States
steps would be the gradual disappearance of withholding taxes on portfolio investments).
161. See generallyH. David Rosenbloom& Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy:
An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1981) (discussing the United States position on tax
sparing). A tax sparing credit is a foreign tax credit for taxes that a foreign country would have levied,
if not for a tax holiday designed to attract foreign investment. Chang H. Lee, Taxationof U.S.-Korea
Technology Transfer: A Developing Country's Point of View, 10 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAw. 1, 40-42
(1992). Other countrieshavegranted such credits in their tax treaties, but the United States has refused
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such a system would put great pressure on the definition of the source of
active income, which is the great weakness of the current regime. 62
Thus, unless the issue of sourcing active income is effectively resolved,
granting a complete exemption from United States tax for such income
would go too far.
III. The Major Problems in the Current Regime: Enforcing ResidenceBased Taxation of Individuals and Allocating Active Income Among
Taxing Jurisdictions
The international consensus described above-to tax passive income
primarily on a residence basis, while active income is taxed primarily on
a source basis-currently suffers from two major flaws that threaten to
undermine the entire structure: the increasing difficulty in enforcing
residence-based taxation of individuals and the increasing difficulty in
determining what is the source of active business income. Although the
simplification measures suggested in Part II can be adopted unilaterally by
the United States, both of these underlying problems can only be addressed
through a consensual approach.
A.

EnforcingResidence-Based Taxation of Individuals

The first problem is practical, not theoretical, but it is very real: even
developed countries find it hard to effectively enforce residence-based
taxation on the global income of individuals, especially from tax havens,
and developing countries find this task impossible. As portfolio investment
grows and becomes increasingly more mobile, this problem becomes more
and more acute. 16
Source-based taxation of passive income is much more effective than
residence-based taxation because the source country has the information
needed to enforce the tax if it wishes to do so. Source-based taxation is,
however, hindered by the existence of tax havens and by the failure of
developed countries to levy source-based taxation on some portfolio income
for fear of driving it towards tax havens. Regardless, as explained earlier,
residence-based taxation of individuals is to be preferred on the grounds of
equity (redistribution), efficiency (CEN), and political accountability.

to do so because the result would be to lower the United States tax levied on United States source
income. Id. at 41.
162. See discussion infra Part III.
163. See Alberto Giovannini & James R. Hines, Jr., CapitalFlight and Tax Competition: Are
There Wable Solutions to Both Problems?, in EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 172, 172 (Alberto
Giovannini & Colin Mayer eds., 1991) (recognizing the problems associated with revenue collection
and "internationally mobile capital"); Richard M. Bird, Income Tax Reform in Developing Countries:
The AdministrativeDimension, 37 BULL. FOR INT'L FIsCAL DOCUMENTATION 7 (1983) (suggesting a
system of withholding taxes on income from "movable capital" because "such income is all too likely
to escape tax entirely in the circumstances of most developing countries").
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There are two complementary ways to develop a solution to this
dilemma. The first is to enhance the information exchange programs under
tax treaties, so that developed countries can share with developing countries
the data necessary for effective enforcement of residence-based taxation,
especially data on tax haven investments.'" The development of information technology and its spread throughout the world promise significant
progress in this direction in the next century.
Another promising
development is the increasing number of treaties, with their attendant
information exchange benefits, between developed and developing countries.'
The combination of these two developments may mean that in

the twenty-first century, even the least advanced tax administration in a
developing country will be able to benefit from the computerized databases

of the most advanced administration-currently the IRS"6-in a developed country.
The second way is for developed countries to establish a concerted
program of withholding taxes at the source of income for the benefit of the

residence country. 67 All developed countries lose from the competitive
abolition of withholding taxes, which impedes their efforts to collect taxes
from their residents on investments in other developed countries."'
Instead, developed countries could agree to levy a uniform backup withholding tax on all portfolio investments that would be retained by the
country imposing the tax unless the investor furnishes documentation
showing that the income has been declared in his or her residence country;
in that case, the source country would transmit the withholding tax to the

164. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL TREATY, supranote 4, art. 26 (encouragingexchangeof information
and administrative assistance between treaty partners in order to enforce effective tax collection).
165. The United States has recently entered into tax treaties with India, Mexico, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Ukraine. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Mar. 4, 1994, U.S.-Ukraine, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 103-30, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Oct. 24, 1993, U.S.Kazakhstan, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-33, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Agreement on Taxation:
Shipping and Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1989, U.S.-India,T.I.A.S. No. 11,711; Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital,
June 17, 1992, U.S.-Russia, reprintedin 3 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 8003; Mexico Treaty, supra note
125.
166. C. Hearingof the House Ways andMeans Comm. OversightSubcomm. Re: InternalRevenue
Service Budget Request, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), available in WESTLAW, CONGHRT
Database, File No. 1995 WL 10383255 at *8 (statement of Margaret Richardson, Commissioner,
Internal Revenue Service) ("I believe that the United States currently has the best administration in the
world, but we at the Internal Revenue Service do recognize that we can no longer do business as
usual.").
167. HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 68-71 (urging the United States to adopt legislation designed to
set the stage for an international arrangement on this issue).
168. See Green, supra note 1, at 55-59 (asserting that the competitive reduction of corporate tax
rates inhibits government's ability to effectively tax mobile capital); see also David Buchan, Belgium
5; Tax Plea to IMF, FINANCIAL. TIMES (London), June 18, 1990, Survey, at 31 (describing the damaging effect of tax competition on the Belgian government's revenues).
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residence country through a clearinghouse mechanism similar to the one
used by some European Community countries for imputation credit
purposes." 9
One can envisage the development of this system in two stages. In the
first stage, developed countries, which could generally be defined as the
members of the OECD, would agree to levy the backup withholding tax at
a uniform rate, perhaps 10%, which would not be creditable. This tax
would drive some investments to tax havens, but the rate would be low
enough to limit the extent of this movement. The essential feature of the
tax is its uniform application by all the major capital importing countries,
which prevents tax competition. In the second stage, investors would
encourage residence countries to enter into agreements with the capital
importing countries to set up the clearinghouse mechanism through which
withholding taxes can be credited against the income tax liability of the
investor in the residence country.'70
How likely is this scenario to occur? The level of agreement needed
for the first stage is much lower than what was needed to reach the current
international tax consensus. If a major capital importing country, such as
the United States, abolished all portfolio withholding, it would put
considerable pressure on the other members of the OECD to cooperate
toward instituting some kind of uniform withholding system to prevent
capital from migrating to the United States. Once a uniform withholding
system were in place, it would constitute a major inducement for developing countries to enter into treaty negotiations to obtain the benefit of the
taxes withheld. Although tax havens will not cooperate, it is possible to
limit their attractiveness through the information exchange programs
outlined above. In addition, the attractiveness of tax havens currently is,
to a large measure, as a conduit for investments into developed countries,
which do not have effective withholding taxes on payments to tax haven
"residents." This attractiveness will be reduced if backup withholding is
implemented by the developed countries.
In addition to preventing tax competition, it may also be possible to
give the developed countries a concrete incentive to participate in the
backup withholding regime by allowing them to retain a portion of the tax
as a fee for their services in collecting and transmitting the tax to the
residence country, especially when the investment balance in the developed
country is tilted heavily in the direction of inbound investment.'

169. See generally Hugh J. Ault, InternationalIssues in CorporateTax Integration, 10 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 484-85, 493 (1978) (discussing the imputation credit for corporate dividends
and its association with the clearinghouse mechanism).
170. For conditions that should be imposed before the tax is remitted to the residence country, see
HUFBAUER, supra note 1, at 69-70.
171. This method is currently implemented between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority:
the taxes withheld from the income of Palestinians working in Israel are remitted to the Palestinian
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Allocating Active Income by Source

Under the current consensus, the determination of the source of
passive income is somewhat unimportant because passive income is primarily taxed on a residence basis, with no distinction as to its source; source
is significant only to the extent that withholding taxes are imposed. The
determination of the source of active income, however, is crucial because
it determines the jurisdiction to which taxes on such income are primarily
due. If there is no consensus on the allocation of active income, the result
is either overtaxation or undertaxation. The income will be overtaxed if
two taxing jurisdictions lay claim to taxing the same income on a source
basis, in which case neither would grant a credit for the other's taxes; the
income will be undertaxed if divergent sourcing rules in two or more jurisdictions cause each jurisdiction to grant the primary right to tax to the
other. 17 '
The most significant issue concerning source-based taxation of active
income involves the proper method of allocating the taxable income of
MNEs among taxing jurisdictions.' 73 In general, there are two approaches to this problem, which has been the subject of heated debate in
the past thirty years. One approach is the arm's-length method, which
respects each corporation included in a MNE as a separate legal entity for
tax purposes, and the other is the unitary or formulary apportionment
method, which treats the entire MNE as one unit and then seeks to
apportion its income among taxing jurisdictions based on a formula.' 74
1. TraditionalArm's-Length Allocations.-The arm's-length method
was first promulgated in regulations issued by the United States Treasury
Department (under the guidance of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
Professor Stanley Surrey) in 1968 and has since become the basis for the
approach of most industrialized countries to the allocation of active income.
The arm's-length method is embodied in most tax treaties, including the
model treaties issued by the United Nations and the OECD."5 It

National Authority, less a "commission" of 25%. See Ephraim Kleiman, The Economic Provisions
of the Agreement between Israel and the PLO (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
172. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 78, 104 (1993) (allocating a
portion of Phillips's income to Japan, even though Japan treated the income as taxable only in the
United States).
173. See generally Green, supra note 1, at 32-46 (discussing the use of the transfer manipulation
price as a means for multinationals to minimize their global income tax liability); Reuven S. AviYonah, The Rise andFall of Arm's Length: A study in the Evolution of U.S. InternationalTaxation,
15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 90 (1995) (demonstrating the possibilities for transfer-pricing abuses by MNEs).
174. Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 92.
175. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 9; U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 9;
see also I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 475 (demonstrating how the arm's-length standard
is an international norm); Organization for Economic Co-operation & Dev., Committee on Fiscal
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involves treating each constituent unit of a MNE, which can be a subsidiary or a branch, as a separate taxable entity and reconstructing its
income-by assigning certain amounts of income to a source in the taxing
jurisdiction-based on hypothetical transactions that would have taken place
had the unit been dealing with other portions of the MNE at arm's
176
length.
The paradigmatic case of applying the arm's-length method involves
finding a precisely comparable transaction for each transaction between
portions of an MNE and deriving the income of each portion based on the
comparable transaction.' 77 For example, suppose the only transaction
between a parent corporation and a subsidiary in a different jurisdiction
involves the parent's manufacture of widgets at a cost of $60 each, the sale
of the widgets to the subsidiary, and the subsidiary's resale of the widgets
to unrelated customers in its jurisdiction for $100 each, at a marketing and
distribution cost to the subsidiary of $20 per widget. On an aprioribasis,
the price charged by the parent to the subsidiary, which determines the
allocation of income between the taxing jurisdictions (the "transfer price"),
can be anything between $60, the minimum amount that would permit the
parent to recover its manufacturing costs, and $80, the maximum amount
that would permit the subsidiary to avoid losing money." 8 Because the
allocation of the residual of $20 between the parent and the subsidiary
makes little economic difference when they are parts of the same MNE, it
is to the taxpayer's advantage to determine the transfer price on the basis
of the effective tax rates inboth jurisdictions and shift the residual to the
jurisdiction with the lower rate.'79 There is some evidence that this type
of tax planning actually takes place-it has even been suggested that the
opportunity to engage in transfer pricing is a major reason for the existence

Affairs, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprisesand Tax Administrators, 9
TAX NOTES INT'L 155, 161-63 (1994) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines] (stating the arm's-length
principle and discussing its justifications). But see Louis M. Kauder, The Unspecific Federal Tax
Policy of Arm's Length: A Comment on the Continuing Vitality of FormularyApportionment at the
FederalLevel, 60 TAX NOTES 1147, 1155 (1993) (arguing that the OECD and U.N. Model Treaties
do not require the application of the arm's-length standard).
176. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1994) (requiring the taxation of transactions involving
controlled taxpayers to be determined by the arm's-length standard).
177. For a description of this "comparable uncontrolled transaction" (CUP) method, see id.
§ 1.482-2(e) (1968) and id. § 1.482-3(b) (1994).
178. See generally Stanley I. Langbein, The UnitaryMethod and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30
TAX NOTES 625, 627 (1986) (explaining the economics behind transfer pricing manipulation); Dale W.
Wickham & Charles I. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solution of the InternationalTransfer
PricingPuzzle: InternationallyAgreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56 TAX NOTES 339, 345-47 (1992)
(discussing the practical and conceptual difficulties presented by the arm's-length pricing requirement).
179. ROGER GORDON & JEFFREY MACKIE-MASON, WHY IS THERE CORPORATE TAXATION IN A
SMALL OPEN ECONOMY? THE RULE OF TRANSFER PRICING AND INCOME SHIFTING 11 (National

Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4690, 1994).
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of MNEs-and that transfer pricing provides a potential method of reducing
the inefficiencies resulting from discrepancies in tax rates among
jurisdictions.'80
If, however, the parent corporation in the example above also sells
widgets to an unrelated party in the same market as the subsidiary for $75,
the tax authorities have a basis for arguing that the proper allocation of the
residual between the related parties should be $15 to the parent and $5 to
the subsidiary. The same result would obtain if an unrelated seller would
sell the same products to an unrelated distributor in the same market for
$75. This is the classic case for applying the arm's-length method to
determine the allocation of income between related parties. In this
situation, the arm's-length method is attractive because it neutralizes the tax
advantage resulting from the MNE's structure, and therefore business will
not be driven to the MNE form for tax reasons.
2. Modification of the Arm's-Length Standard.
a. Cost-Plus and Resale PriceMethods.-As early as 1968, the
United States Treasury recognized that such "comparable uncontrolled
prices" (CUPs) may not be found."'
Consequently, the 1968
regulations, as well as other countries and the OECD, adopted two
additional methods for determining the proper transfer price: the cost plus
and resale price methods." Under these methods, the profit margin of
either the manufacturing party or the distributing party is determined by
comparing it to the profit margins of unrelated manufacturers or
distributors of similar products in the same market. The advantage of these
methods is that they do not require a specific transaction involving the
same product; thus, they represent a move away from pure comparability,
but still require a finding of rough comparability between the taxpayer and
the unrelated manufacturers or distributors.
Over the last fifteen years, however, it has become increasingly clear
that in a large number of cases involving MNEs, it is not possible to find
even the roughly comparable transactions required to apply the resale price
and cost plus methods and that the attempt to do so involves immense

180. See Tax Underpayments by U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Companies: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-29 (1990)
(statement of Rep. 1.1.
Pickle, Chairman) (summarizing economic evidence regarding the undertaxation
of multinationals); cf. Harry Grubert et al., Explaining the Low TaxableIncome of Foreign-Controlled
Companies in the United States, in ALBERTO GioVANNINI ET AL., STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 237 (1993) (rejecting several alternative explanations for underpayment of United States tax
by foreign companies and concluding that transfer pricing accounts for at least half of the
underpayments).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(e)(2) (1968).
182. Id. § 1.482-2(e)(2)-(4).
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administrative costs."n In those situations, there is no clear answer to
the crucial question: how to divide the profit continuum (between the
minimum price acceptable to the seller, and the maximum acceptable to the
buyer, i.e., the range between $60 and $80 in the example given earlier)
between the related parties. Because there is a range of prices that would
have been an acceptable result in arm's-length negotiations, there is no
single arm's-length price; the tax result depends on which of many
acceptable prices is actually chosen by the related parties."'
The pure arm's-length method is unworkable in many situations
because there is no reason why comparable transactions should exist. An
examination of the extensive economic literature concerning MNEs may

explain why comparable transactions sometimes cannot be found. This
economic literature seeks to answer the question of why enterprises choose
to operate abroad through related parties rather than through unrelated

distributors or licensees."r

If one applies Coase's theory of the firm, the

use of MNEs can be seen as an alternative to market-based transactions that
results because of the various costs associated with operating through the
market: governmental costs (taxes, trade barriers, and the like), natural
costs (transaction costs), and structural costs (such as the ability to exert
monopoly power through the related-party structure). 8 6 The MNE internalizes those costs and is therefore more efficient than market-based

transactions.'
There are numerous kinds of market imperfections that lead to the
development of MNEs. For example, a potential licensor may have
valuable unpatentable trade secrets that it does not wish to share with a
potential licensee before a licensing agreement is signed, but it may be able
to persuade the licensee that the product is valuable without revealing the
secret (information asymmetry). Thus, it has been shown that MNEs will
183. E.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445, 450-52 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(demonstrating the difficulties in obtaining data on comparable transactions for use in evaluating costplus profit margins).
184. Langbein, supra note 178, at 637 ("[T]he 'arm's-length' criterion coherently generates two
different prices as 'arm's-length' prices-two numbers which mark the limits of a continuum along
which any price is an arm's-length price.").
185. E.g., John H. Dunning, Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the Multinational
Enterprise:A SearchforanEclecticApproach, in READINSiN INTERNATiONALENTERPRiSE250, 25861 (John Drew ed., 1995) (discussing how the benefits of internalization can encourage MNEs to
forego market transactions with unrelated parties).
186. See RONALD H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
33-35 (1988) (discussing the economic advantages of operating as a single fin rather than through the
free market).
187. See, e.g., Jean-Francois Hennart, The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational
Enterprise,in THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM 81, 81 (Christos N. Pitelis & Roger Sugden
eds., 1991) (describing "the transaction cost or internalization approach [which] argues that the
transaction cost theory constitutes a general theory of economic organization which can explain the
choice between hierarchical co-ordination and other forms of organization").
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arise in industries in which patents, the existence of which can solve the
188
information asymmetry problem, are less common or not enforceable.
Another example is the protection of goodwill inherent in a trademark. If
it is difficult to monitor quality, a trademark licensee can "free ride" by
debasing the quality, while continuing to enjoy the benefit of goodwill
associated with the trademark and potentially damaging the reputation
associated with the trademark.189 Thus, international banking, insurance,
and accounting operations, in which quality is hard to monitor, tend to rely
less on franchising and more on control." MNEs are also common in
those situations in which long-term futures contracts for a product are
difficult to obtain because they require major initial investments (leading
to backward integration into production) and in those situations in which
the difficulty in monitoring the behavior of unrelated distributors (as
opposed to employees) leads to forward integration into sales."
If MNEs exist because of imperfections in the arm's-length market,
the implication is that comparable transactions will not be found when a
MNE is successful because the MNE will have driven the arm's-length
competitors out of business. Presumably a MNE that could have operated
at arm's length through a local entity would have done so because of the
normal difficulties of operating in a foreign country with a different culture
and legal system. If a MNE chooses to integrate and still remains profitable, this suggests that there are disadvantages to operating through the
market-disadvantages that would make finding arm's-length comparables
a difficult task. 192
In terms of the example given above, this analysis suggests that the
profit margin of the MNE as a whole would be higher than the sum of that
of its constituent parts would be, if they dealt with each other at arm's
length. One method of dividing the profit between the related parties in
the absence of comparable transactions is to analyze the functions performed by each party and to allocate to each party a return appropriate to
its function that is based on the return of entities performing comparable
functions."I However, if the MNE is more profitable than the sum of

188. Id. at 85-88.
189. Id. at 88-89.
190. William D. Turner & Stephen K. Green, CorporateChallenge to CorporateTreasures, in
THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERP SE IN TRANSITION 125 (Phillip D. Grub et al. eds., 1986) (noticing
that when multinational corporations centralized their treasuries, generally the quality of financial
decision making improved).
191. Id. at 89-93.
192. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 148 ("[T]he very existence of integrated multinationals
is evidence that the [arm's-length standard] does not reflect economic reality.... [Miultinationals
exist because of market and non-market advantages that are derived from their structure.").
193. This "profit split" method was first suggested by theTreasury in 1988, I.R.S. Notice 88-123,
1988-2 C.B. 458, 490, and has been incorporated into the recent final regulations. See Treas. Reg.
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its parts would be, even this method would leave a residual that cannot be
allocated to any portion of the MNE because it represents the additional
profit resulting simply from the existence of the MNE as a whole."
This residual cannot be allocated in its entirety to either party on theoretical
grounds. 195
b. IRS Challenges and Court Decisions.-In a long series of
cases since 1980, this problem has bedeviled the federal courts in their
attempts to deal with transfer pricing issues under Section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code in the absence of comparable transactions. The
result has been a series of cases in which the IRS has attempted to persuade
the courts to look only at one side of the equation and to allocate the entire
residual to the United States side." Typically, the IRS has taken the
position that the foreign manufacturer should not be allocated more than a
return on the pure manufacturing function and that any profit above that
should be allocated to the United States distributor. The IRS has argued
that the manufacturer is assured of a market because of the relationship
between the parties and therefore should not be allocated any return for
risk. The courts have unanimously rejected this position, not necessarily
because the IRS argument was wrong per se-it could hardly be denied that
the relationship between the parties changed the riskiness of the subsidiary's operations-but because it did not follow from the argument that
the entire residual should be allocated to the United States merely because
its tax rates were higher. In the absence of meaningful guidance in the
regulations on what to do in the absence of comparable transactions, the
courts instead have split the residual profit between the related parties
based on some vague intuitive understanding of their respective
functions." 9
§ 1.482-6 (1994) (explaining the profit split method which "evaluates whether the allocation of the
combined operating profit or loss attributable to one or more controlled transactions is arm's length by
reference to the relative value of each controlled taxpayer's contribution to that combined operating
profit or loss").
194. Suppose that a comparison with unrelated manufacturers suggests that the manufacturing
portion of the MNE should have a profit margin of 20% of its costs, or $12, and a comparison with
unrelated distributors suggests that the distributing portion of the MNE should have a profit margin of
10% of its costs, or $2. If one looks only at the manufacturer, this would lead to a transfer price of
$60 + $12 = $72; if one looks only at the distributor, this would lead to a transfer price of $80 - $2
= $78. A residual of $6 is left because of the relationship between the parties; had they been
unrelated, the analysis above suggests that the costs of each would have been higher and that the total
profit from the transaction would have been $14 rather than $20.
195. Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 148-49.
196. For an extended discussion of these cases, see Avi-Yonsh, supra note 173.
197. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 375 (1991) (using the court's
"best estimate" of an appropriate transfer price); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252,
376 (1987) (making a "best judgment" allocation of profit); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
996, 1147-69 (1985) (basing the determination of "profit split" generally on functions performed by
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Alternatively, to avoid such "rough justice" approximations, the
federal courts have strained to find comparable transactions when none
could economically be found. Thus, in United States Steel Corp. v.
Commissioner,'98 the court of appeals found that a comparable transaction
existed despite widely different volume and risks and even though the court
realized that the result did not reflect "economic reality.""
A similar
outcome was reached in Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner:" the
Tax Court held that a comparable transaction was validly chosen despite
the extremely different economic conditions existing between the related
parties,2 ° ' and the court of appeals affirmed because such differences
"will always be the case when transactions between commonly controlled
entities are compared to transactions between independent entities."' 2
This series of cases, which still continues and threatens to overwhelm
the IRS and the Tax Court, has led to increasing criticism from the General
Accounting Office and Congress of the arm's-length method, as applied at
the federal level.' The Conference Report on the 1986 Tax Reform Act
instructed the Treasury Department to conduct a study of the problem and
to consider carefully "whether the existing regulations [implementing the
arm's-length method] could be modified in any respect."'
The result
has been a lengthy study by the Treasury recommending significant
changes to the arm's-length method, 5 followed by proposed and tempothe parties, in a 196-page opinion), affid, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988); Hospital Corp. of Am. v.
Commissioner, 81 T.C. 520, 596-601 (1983) (attributing 75% of the subsidiary's taxable income to
the parent and using its "best judgment on the lengthy and inconclusive record before" it despite there
being "little quantitative evidence in this record upon which [the court] can determine what a reasonable
allocation of profits would be").
198. 617 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980).
199. Id. at 951.
200. 92 T.C. 525 (1989), af#'d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
201. Id. at 591.
202. Bausch & Lomb, 933 F.2d at 1091.
203. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423-24 (1985) (criticizing the arm's-length
method for its refusal to recognize that the economicrelationship among related parties is fundamentally
different from that among unrelated parties); see also Daniel J. Frisch, The BALRM Approach to
TransferPricing,42 NAT'L TAX 1. 261,262 (1989) (recognizing that MNEs are integration economies
whose sizeable incomes cannot be identified with any single member of the group); Langbein, supra
note 178, at 627 (questioning the "viability [of the arm's-length standard] as a long term solution to
the problem of allocating the income of multinational enterprises"); Stanley I. Langbein, Transaction
Cost, Production Cost, and Tax Transfer Pricing, 44 TAX NoTES 1391, 1392 (1989) (noting that the
debate over the benefits of using an arm's-length standard was opened once again under governmentordered studies); Wickham & Kerester, supra note 178, at 340 (recounting congressional testimony
blaming the arm's-length standard for the IRS's poor record in transfer-pricing cases); Note,
MultinationalCorporationsandIncome Allocation Under Section 482 of the InternalRevenue Code,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1214-23 (1976) (analyzing the cost savings that commonly controlled entities
realize through economies of scale and reduced transaction costs but that are ignored by the arm'slength method).
204. H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-688 (1986).
205. I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
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rary regulations with additional changes" and, finally, new final
regulations adopted in July 1994 that significantly modify the arm's-length
method as applied by the United States.'
3. New Section 482 Regulations.-Althoughthey retain the traditional
CUP, cost plus, and resale price methods, the new regulations under
Section 482 introduce two significant innovations.
First, a new
"comparable profits method" (CPM) is introduced, under which the functions performed by the "tested party" (the party whose functions are most
easily defined) are analyzed and the tested party's profit levels are then
compared to the profits of parties performing comparable functions (under
a relatively lax standard of comparison). The profits of the tested party are
then adjusted to fall within a range of profits earned by the comparable
parties." t However, this method does not indicate what to do with the
residual that remains after each party is allocated the return appropriate for
its functions. For that, a profit split method similar to that used by courts
may be applied. Rather than using the intuitive analysis performed by the
courts, the regulations allocate the profit split according to each party's
contributions to developing intangibles, which are presumed to account for
the residual.'3°
The striking fact about the profit split method is that it is essentially
a unitary or formulary apportionment method: the entire residual profit of
both parties together is split according to a formula based on the comparison of certain attributes of the parties. Indeed, as I have argued
elsewhere, 1 0 the shift from CUP to resale price or cost plus to CPM to
profit split can be seen as a continuum, with pure transaction-based
allocations on one extreme and pure formulary allocation on the other.
With each step away from CUP, the level of comparability required diminishes, but one gets closer to the underlying issue of how to divide the
overall combined profit between the related parties.2 '
These developments, along with the adoption of similar profit split
methods elsewhere in the world," 2 have recently led a group of experts,
including senior officials of the United Kingdom Inland Revenue, the Fiscal

206. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1992); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1993).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (1994).
208. Id. § 1.482-5(c).
209. Id. § 1.482-6.
210. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 173.
211. Id. at 93-94 (arguing that the arm's-length and formulary methods of income allocation form
"the two extreme ends of a continuum"). I owe the idea that the level of comparability diminishes as
one moves closer to determination of profits to Philip R. West, Esq., of Steptoe & Johnson in
Washington, D.C.
212. Japan, for example, has adopted a similar method. Marc M. Levey et al., Japan'sTransfer
Pricing System is Evolving Along U.S. Lines, 4 J. INT'L TAx'N 407, 411 (1993).
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Affairs Division of the OECD, the Japanese National Tax Administration,
and the United States Treasury, to conclude that "the arm's length principle
and formulary apportionment should not be seen as polar extremes ....
It is not clear where the arm's length principle ceases and formulary
apportionment begins." 3 This is a highly significant statement in view
of the frequent assertion that no compromise between the arm's-length and
the formulary allocation methods is possible.214 It suggests that we may
be witnessing the birth of a new consensus, in which the labels put on the
methods are less important than the ability to use a range of methods along
the entire continuum.
4. A Transfer-Pricing Consensus?-If a consensual approach to
transfer pricing is adopted, what may such a consensus look like?215 The
discussion above suggests that it should be based (as in the new United
States regulations) on a series of methods, with pure arm's-length being
used if comparable transactions can be found, and some type of profit
split-reflecting the unitary treatment of the affiliated group-being used
if there are no comparable transactions available. In fact, the adoption of
profit split methods by the United States mirrors developments in other
OECD countries, which have moved away from regarding each corporation
in an affiliated group as a separate taxable entity for all purposes.2 6
On the basis of these developments, it may be suggested that a
compromise consensus can be adopted internationally along the following
lines. First, if there are arm's-length comparable transactions (using the
standard of comparability for CUP in the new United States regulations),
they are the best indication of the appropriate profit split between related
parties, and the income should be allocated on that basis. Second, in the
absence of comparable transactions, a functional analysis of the portions of
213. Brian 1. Arnold &Thomas E. McDonnell, Report on the InvitationalConferenceon Transfer
Pricing:The Allocation ofIncome andExpenses Among Countries, 61 TAX NOTES 1377, 1381 (1993).
214. C. I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 475 (responding to taxpayer and foreigngovernment fears that the "commensurate with income" standard included in the Tax Reforms Act of
1986 was inconsistent with the arm's-length method). For examples of more recent statements along
the same lines, see John Iekel, Samuels DefendsRevenue Estimating, Arm's Length Standard,65 TAX
NOTES 1587, 1588 (1994) and John Turro, Treasury Continues to Champion Worldwide Arm's Length
Standard,66 TAX NOTES 316 (1995).
215. For a more extended discussion of this proposal, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 147-59.
216. On the use of formulary methods by other countries, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 157
& n.344. See also OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 7(4) (granting permission to use formulary methods in the case of branches). Other examples of the trend away from treating each
corporation in an affiliated group as a separate entity for all purposes include the United States subpart
F regime, which combats deferral by imputing the passive earnings of foreign subsidiaries to their
domestic parents, I.R.C. §§ 951-960 (1994); see also BRIAN 1. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN
CONTROL1
CORPORATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1986) (surveying similar methods
used by other countries), and the United States indirect foreign tax credit, which treats taxes paid by
foreign subsidiaries as if they were paid by the United States parent, I.R.C. § 902 (1994).
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the MNE in each jurisdiction should be made, and returns should be
allocated to each function (and not just to the tested party, as under the
CPM) on the basis of the profits earned by parties performing the same
functions in arm's-length transactions. The functional analysis should
include the allocation of rents to the jurisdiction furnishing the basis for
such rents (e.g., natural resources or a cheap labor pool).
Finally, the residual profit should be split on an agreed-upon basis.
Because the residual results from the relationship between the affiliated
corporations, any allocation rule would be arbitrary. Thus, the precise
profit split agreed upon is immaterial, as long as the same rule is used by
everyone. Because the most important point is to obtain a consensus, the
most likely solution in the case of manufacturing MNEs would appear to
be a division of the residual among all of the jurisdictions in which the
MNE operates (at least if its operations constitute a permanent establishment), based equally on the MNE's tangible assets and sales, which are
factors that are harder for the MNE to manipulate even through the use of
tax havens. This type of allocation would appear to be closest to the goal
of internation equity and less loaded in favor of developed countries than
the new United States profit split formula, which emphasizes the costs of
developing intangibles, costs that are most commonly incurred in developed
countries. If most manufacturing operations of MNEs are in developing
countries, and if most sales are in developed countries, then using these
two factors would result in an approximately even division of the residual
between the two types of jurisdictions.2 7 However, different methods
of splitting the residual need to be applied in industries that are not based
on manufacturing, such as the natural resources and financial services
industries."' The new OECD draft report on transfer pricing supports
the possible use of various types of profit splits in these cases. 1 9
Two aspects of the proposed system of allocating profits of a MNE are
more important than the precise method adopted to split the residual.
First, any allocation method must begin by treating all affiliated
corporations that are controlled by the same interests as a single unit for
tax purposes. The definition of control can be broad and flexible, similar
to the definition proposed by the American Law Institute and to the one

217. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (as amended in 1988), examples 1 & 2 (using assets
and sales to allocate the income from sales of inventory produced in one country and sold in another).
This method is permitted under the arm's-length standard. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art.
7(4).
218. Indeed, because the top 300 multinationals, which control about a quarter of the world's
productive assets, see supra note 30, account for a very large part of the transfer-pricing problem, a
specific formula can be developed in advance for each one. For a discussion of such "advancepricing
agreements," see Avi-Yonah, supra note 173, at 154-56. For an example of such an industry formula,
see I.R.S. Notice 94-40, 1994-1 C.B. 351.
219. OECD Guidelines, supra note 175, at 155.
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used under Section 482;' the operation of the method outlined earlier
would permit results that are equivalent to pure arm's-length separate
accounting when a controlled group is not operating as a unit. As noted
above, tax law (as well as other areas of law) has for a long time been
moving toward disregarding the separate existence of subsidiaries, and this
move would merely be the logical culmination of the trend.2 '
Second, the allocation method adopted must not distinguish among
MNEs on the artificial ground of where the parent corporation is incorporated, managed, or controlled. In the current world economy, such
distinctions are becoming increasingly meaningless and merely encourage
the reincorporation of the parent in the most favorable jurisdiction (a tactic
that has recently been the focus of IRS attention in the United States).'
C. Reaching a ConsensualSolution
Can a consensus on the lines outlined above be reached? It is
fashionable to despair of change in international taxation that depends on
consensus and cooperation rather than on unilateral actions by taxing
authorities. However, this view is curiously ahistorical. In 1923, it must
have seemed equally hopeless, if not more so, to try to develop a consensus on the allocation of income between source and residence jurisdictions. After all, even though economists could argue that taxation of
portfolio investment income at its source hurt the source country, giving
up such taxes entailed a real revenue sacrifice by those countries in the
broader interests of their economies. Source countries also gave up
revenue when they agreed not to tax active business income from activities
that did not rise to the level of a permanent establishment. Even more
striking was the sacrifice required from residence countries when they
agreed to refrain from taxing the active foreign business income of their
residents in the interest of avoiding international double taxation. Yet
today, we have an internationally accepted consensus on these issues, and
on many smaller details of the system, and a multitude of bilateral tax
treaties follows the OECD and UN models embodying this consensus.'2 3

220. See I.R.C. § 482 (1994) (recognizing direct or indirect ownership or control as grounds for
apportionment of tax liability); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (1994) (setting forth the general principles and
guidelines to be followed in determining a taxpayer's true taxable income under § 482); Avi-Yonah,
supra note 173, at 153 (stating that the need to define a unitary business has proven to be a source of
controversy and requires complicated rules).
221. For a discussion of this trend in other areas of law, see PHILuP I. BLUMBERG, THE
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 89-120 (1993).
222. I.R.S. Notice 94-46, 1994-1 C.B. 356.
223. See Richard E. Andersen, Trade, Regional Interests Drive 1992 Global Tax Treaty
Developments, 21. INT'LTAX'N 379, 380 (1992) ("Mexico signed a comprehensiveincome tax treaty
with Canada, based on the U.N. and OECD models."); Ulrik Fleischer-Michaelsen, Denmark's
Transfer Pricing System Is Attractive to Foreign Corporations, 4 1. INT'L TAX'N 226, 227 (1993)
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The case for reaching consensus on the enforcement of residence-based
taxation and determination of the source for active income is at least as
strong today as the case for consensus on the general structure was in
1923. Compared with 1923, the world's economy is much more integrated, international capital flows much larger, and MNEs make up a much
higher proportion of world GDP.'
Moreover, consensus is necessary
to avoid serious undertaxation of individuals (in the case of backup
withholding on portfolio income)' and MNEs (in the case of allocating
active income to its source).'
Both developed and developing countries
have much to gain and little to lose from reaching agreement, and
significant revenue is lost by all concerned from failing to do so.
To understand how both developing and developed countries can gain
from reaching a consensus on the two issues identified as the main flaws
of the current regime, consider first the tax results under the current
regime in the stylized world set forth earlier. 7 As described, the
stylized world is made up of the United States, India, and the Caymans,
and in which MNE X is headquartered in the United States. The residents
of the United States (the developed country) invest in the United States, in
the Caymans (the tax haven), and in X; the residents of India (the
developing country) invest in India, in the United States, and in the
Caymans; and X is engaged in active business in the United States and
India and siphons its profits to the Caymans. X achieves this result by
using a holding company in the Caymans to buy products from its manufacturing subsidiary in India and to resell them at a higher price to its
marketing subsidiary in the United States and then by using a finance
subsidiary in the Caymans to siphon profits from its operations in the
United States and India (by utilizing loopholes in their withholding
regimes).'

("Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model have been incorporated in almost all income tax treaties into
which Denmark has entered."); Denis Streiff & Clotilde Fournier, France-Mexico Tax Treaty Follows
OECD Model, with Variations, 5 1. INT'L TAX'N 39, 41-42 (1994) (describing procedures taken to
avoid double taxation, in conformance with treaties signed by France with Germany and Sweden);
Sabine Stricker, China Forgesa Uniform Tax System for ForeignInvestors, 4 1. INT'L TAX'N 26, 26
(1993) (noting that the People's Republic of China has "entered into treaties for the avoidance of double
taxation with the majority of Western countries").
224. See JOHNH. DUNNINGMULTNATIONALENTERPRiSESAND THE GLOBALEcONOMY 599-603

(1992) (tracing the evolution of the global economy from the embryonic MNEs that existed before
World War I to today's prominent and complex MNEs).
225. For an analysis of how individuals are often undertaxed on portfolio income, see supra
subpart H(A). For the suggestion that a new consensus should be reached, see supra Part III.
226. For a discussion of how the current consensus undertaxes MNEs, see supra subpart H(A).
227. See supra Part I.
228. For an extended discussion of MNEa' ability to avoid taxation, see Green, supra note 1, at

32-63. See also GORDON & MACKIE-MASON, supra note 179, at 9-12 (suggesting that MNEs exist to
take advantage of such loopholes).
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Under the current international tax structure, the tax results of this
series of transactions would be as follows. The United States taxes its
residents on their active income from the United States and their passive
income from the United States and the Caymans, including income from
X. 9 It does not generally tax residents of India on their investment
income from the United States because such taxation might induce Indian
residents to shift their investments to the Caymans. The United States
employs labor-intensive methods in an attempt to tax X on its profits
derived from sources within the United States; it intensively audits the
transfer prices between X's affiliates in the United States, India, and the
Caymans, but it is not very successful. It also seeks to prevent X from
deducting its intercompany interest payments and imposes withholding
taxes on such payments. India taxes its residents on their active income
from India, but it does not tax them on their passive income from the
United States and the Caymans (either because it employs the exemption
method or because it cannot effectively enforce residence-based worldwide
taxation). Like the United States, India is also not very successful in
taxing X because it has no resources to enforce transfer-pricing rules or
thin capitalization rules. Although India has high withholding tax rates, it
derives little income from them in practice because there is little individual
investment in India except for the interest payments paid by X to its
financing subsidiary.
How does this model measure up against the ideal of taxing active
business income at its source and passive income on a residence basis?
Active income under this model is only taxed on a residence basis to
individuals, but it is not taxed at all when earned by a MNE. Passive
income is taxed only when earned by the residents of the United States;
India is unable to enforce either residence-based or source-based taxation
of passive income. The gainers are the wealthy elite of India and X, who
avoid taxes that should be paid under internationally accepted norms.
This analysis suggests that both the United States and India would
benefit from a mutual change in which they abandon source-based taxation
of passive income, but adopt a unitary approach to taxing X on a source
basis. The United States would benefit from being able to tax X on the
profits attributable to the United States under the formula without
expending immense resources on transfer-pricing audits and litigation.
India would benefit from taxing X on part of its profits and would not lose

229. The United States also purports to tax foreign source active business income that is taxed at
a lower rate in the sourcejurisdiction (to the extent of the difference between foreign and United States
tax rates). However, the ability to average rates from high- and low-tax jurisdictions for purposes of
the foreign tax credit will often reduce, if not eliminate, the United States tax on foreign-source active
business income. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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from abandoning source-based taxation on passive income because its
source-based taxation effectively falls only on X (in its transactions with
affiliates). India would also benefit if, as suggested above, the United
States imposed backup withholding taxes on investments in the United
States as a collection device for India. The major remaining loophole
would then be India's inability to tax passive income earned by its residents
from the Caymans, but the United States can aid in that effort as well by
providing India with information and assistance in developing methods for
effective residence-based taxation of foreign passive income. The United
States will have an incentive to do so because investments will otherwise
flow from it to the Caymans if it imposes withholding taxes on behalf of
India.
Assuming that reaching consensus is in the interest of all parties, how
can it be reached? As Richard Vann has suggested, the progress made
recently in reaching agreement in international trade talks, which also
involve divergent interests and real costs in reaching agreement, can serve
as a model.' It would be appropriate to establish a negotiating framework similar to GATT in order to resolve the two issues identified above,
perhaps in the context of a new multilateral agreement on international
investment, as suggested by Bergsten and Graham.2 1 The United States,
as the traditional leader in international tax matters, should take the lead in
proposing such a framework initially for negotiations among the OECD
members and then expanding to include developing nations as well.
IV. Simplifying the International Tax Regime Once a Consensus is
Reached
Let us assume that a uniform withholding tax has been put in place by
the developed nations and that a consensual method has been adopted to
allocate the income of MNEs among taxing jurisdictions that treats each
MNE as a single unit. What are the possible consequences for the international tax regime described above?
The simplified system of international income taxation that this Article
proposes is as follows. All individual taxpayers should be taxed by their
country of residence on their active and passive income, from whatever
source derived. This would entail, as under the current United States
system, provisions that require look-through treatment in the case of
corporations controlled by relatively few individual taxpayers. 2 The

230. Richard I. Vann, A Model Tax Treaty for the Asian-PacificRegion? (pt. 2), 45 BULL. FOR
INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 151 (1991).
231. C. Fred Bergsten& Edward M. Graham, Needed: NewRulesforForeignDrectInvestment?,
7 INT'L TRADE 1. 15 (1992).
232. I.R.C. §§ 551-558 (1994).
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taxation of individuals should be enforceable through backup withholding
by source countries, with the revenue transmitted under treaties to the
residence country, and by information exchange aimed against source
countries that refuse to implement backup withholding."
All publicly held corporations (MNEs) should be taxed exclusively on
a source basis, with the source of income determined on a unitary basis by
applying a consensus formula. All intercorporate transactions within a
MNE should be ignored for this purpose;' passive income earned by a
MNE from outside sources should be allocated on the same basis as the
MNE's active business income. In addition, it should not matter where the
MNE is headquartered (or where each subsidiary is incorporated); the
residence of the MNE should have no meaning.235
This regime has two problem areas because it relies on a distinction
between individuals, who are presumed to earn mostly passive income and
are thus taxable on the basis of residence, and corporations, which are
presumed to earn mostly active income and are thus taxable on the basis
of source. The first problem is how to tax active income earned by individuals from foreign sources, such as through a sole proprietorship, a
partnership, or a closely held corporation. The second problem is how to
tax passive income earned through publicly held corporations, such as
PFICs.
The issue in both cases is whether to prefer taxation based on the
character of the income, which would suggest source-based taxation in the
first case and residence-based taxation in the second, or taxation based on
the identity of the ultimate taxpayer, which would suggest residence-based
taxation in the first case and source-based taxation in the second. On the
whole, I believe administrative simplicity favors taxing active income
earned by individuals on a residence basis and passive income earned by
PFICs on a source basis. Taxing active foreign income of individuals on
a source basis would require the maintenance of a foreign tax credit system
if that income is to be included in the worldwide tax basis for individuals.
It would also require a branch profit tax mechanism if subsidiaries and
branches (including partnerships) are to be taxed in the same way. On the
whole, the trend in the United States and elsewhere is to avoid entity-level
taxation for closely held investment vehicles (by using entities such as
Subchapter S corporations and Limited Liability Companies), and that trend
suggests that source countries should refrain from taxing active income
earned through such investment vehicles and that residence countries should
233.
234.
one were
181.
235.

See supra subpart m(A). For a similar proposal, see HUFBAUER, supra note 1, ch. 4.
Income from intercorporate transactions would, of course, be allocated based on a CUP, if
available; however, such CUPs are rarely determinable. See supra text accompanying note
See supra subpart II(B).
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tax them all currently on a look-through basis. 6 The revenue loss
should not be too great, given that most foreign direct investment is made
through MNEs. 7
Taxing income earned through PFICs on a residence basis is complicated immensely by the problems of how a shareholder can know about the
income of an entity she does not control, by liquidity problems, and by
allocation problems that arise when shares of a PFIC are sold. 8 In
addition, PFICs are widely used to invest in developing countries, which
would be reluctant to give up source-based taxation in this case. I would
therefore tend to except PFICs from the rule and to tax them as an active
business similar to banks and other financial institutions, that is, on a
source basis. Actual distributions from PFICs should, however, be
included in the income of the investors, like any other income.
A.

Proposalsfor Simplification
Truly dramatic simplification can be achieved in the current United
States international tax rules (and in the tax rules of other countries as well)
if the following changes are adopted in the United States regime:
1. The source rules can be abolished in their entirety.
Currently, the source rules serve two functions: to limit the
taxation of foreign taxpayers to United States source income
and to limit creditable foreign taxes to those imposed on
foreign source income." 3
The first function will be
superfluous because there will be no taxation at the source
of income on foreign individuals (except as a collection
mechanism, which is linked to practical enforceability, not
theoretical source) and because the taxation of foreign
corporations will be determined by the unitary formula. The
second function will be superfluous because there will be no
foreign tax credit. The source rules for expenses can also
be abolished because MNEs will be treated as single units
and their global profits after global expenses allocated under
the formula.
2. The foreign tax credit rules can be abolished in their
entirety. Credit should not be given to source-based taxation

236. This suggestion is similar to the proposal by Green, supra note 1, at 72, to tax all MNEs on
a look-through basis, which I consider impractical for the reasons given supra Part I.
237. For a discussion substantiating the importance of international direct investment through
MNEs, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
238. See Shay, supra note 138, at 374-83 (analyzing the complex rules for taxing a United States
shareholder of a PFIC); Tillinghast, supra note 138, at 197-206 (discussing and offering solutions to
the complexities of taxing shareholders of non-controlled foreign corporations).
239. Green, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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of passive income of individuals.'
Nor should credit be
given to foreign taxation of active income because it will be
taxed on an exemption system: only that portion of MNE
income allocable to the United States by formula should be
taxed. Double taxation issues can be dealt with through the
treaty process, as they currently are by countries with an
exemption system.
3. Of the antideferral rules, subpart F can be abolished because
passive income within a MNE will be ignored, and passive
income from outside a MNE will be allocated through the
formula in the same proportions as the active income is
allocated.
The antideferral rules relating to close
corporations should be retained and consolidated and should
relate to both active and passive income. The PFIC rules
can be abolished. 2"
4. The branch profits tax can be abolished because it is a proxy
for source-based taxation of passive income.'
5. Section 482 of the Code will generally not be required for
international transactions because of the allocation formula
for MNEs. u 3
6. The earnings stripping rule can be abolished because it only
applies to interest paid to related parties, which will be
disregarded if MNEs are treated as single units.
Thus, the international aspects of the United States income tax system
will be limited to rules designed to ensure current taxation of income
earned abroad by individuals through closely held corporations and the
single sourcing rule for MNEs. This level of simplification can be
achieved through extension of the principles of taxing active income at its
source and passive income by residence, and through extension of the trend
to disregard both the artificial distinctions among related corporations that
form part of MNEs and the distinctions between close corporations and
their shareholders.
B. Effects of CorporateIntegration
Finally, the issue of the integration of the corporate and individual
income taxes needs to be addressed. There is a consensus among
240. See supra subpart H(C).
241. Cf. H.R. 13, supra note 117, §§ 401-404 (proposing to consolidate these provisions).
242. Arguably, the branch profits tax needs to be retained as part of the backup withholding
regime, but the need for simplification makes withholding on actual distributions preferable.
243. This will eliminate the vast majority of litigation under § 482. For a discussion of the vast
amount of litigation under § 482, almost all of which is international, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 173,
at 112-29.
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economists and tax scholars that taxing corporate income twice, first when
it is earned by a corporation and again when it is distributed to shareholders (as is the case in "classical" systems like the United States),'
leads to significant welfare losses (because of the tax incentive to invest

through unincorporated entities) as well as increased complexity (because
of the need to distinguish between deductible dividends and nondeductible
interest).'5 However, as Hugh Ault has pointed out, integration poses
a problem for the international consensus described above because it
implies that either the active income earned through corporations or the

passive income derived by shareholders from the corporation in the form
of dividends should not be taxed.'
If integration is achieved in a form
that reduces taxes at the corporate level, it undermines the taxation of

active income at its source. If integration is achieved in a form that
reduces taxes at the shareholder level, it undermines the taxation of passive

income on a residence basis. Therefore, most countries that have adopted
integration do not extend its benefits to foreign shareholders except by
treaty, and even then usually only in treaties with countries that have
integrated tax systems and can reciprocate. 4 7 However, this result

violates the nondiscrimination principle that also underlies the international
treaty network.48
How can integration be reconciled with the proposal set out above,
which seeks to preserve the taxation of active income at its source and
passive income on a residence basis? To answer this question, it is first

244. See TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 46, at 1 (describing the current United
States system as a "classical system of corporate income taxation").
245. For discussions of the rationale for integration, see, e.g., id. and ALIINTEGRATIONREPORT,
supra note 46. See generally Alvin Warren, The Relation andIntegrationof Individualand Corporate
Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981).
246. Ault, supranote 14, at 566; see also Warren, supra note 14, at 599 (proposing an alternative
method for dealing with this problem).
247. Cf. Ault, supra note 14, at 582-608 (surveying international tax treaties and suggesting
approaches to future international tax treaties affecting integrated systems of corporate taxation). The
United States treaties with the United Kingdom and France are exceptions to this rule. See Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., art. 10, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5677-79;
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, July 28, 1967, U.S.-Fr., art. 10, 19
U.S.T. 5280, 5294-96.
248. See Warren, supra note 14, at 603-04 (pointing out that it is impossible to have
nondiscrimination, economic neutrality, and reciprocity at the same time). Professor Warren also
suggests that the United States abandon reciprocity to preserve nondiscrimination; thus, a country such
as Canada, which grants an imputation credit to domestic shareholders would have to grant a similar
benefit to foreign shareholders, even if those shareholders reside in a country with a classical tax
system such as the United States, which would not be required to grant any benefits to Canadian
shareholders in return. Id. at 612-13. I would abandon nondiscrimination to preserve reciprocity
because I do not believe countries will agree to enter into tax treaties unless reciprocity is preserved;
in the Canada and United States case, if nondiscrimination were the overriding principle, Canada would
have an incentive to shift to a classical system to avoid the unilateral granting of benefits illustrated
above.
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necessary to consider the three methods of achieving integration of corporate and shareholder level taxes.' The first method emphasizes the role
of the corporation as a mere withholding device for taxes imposed on
shareholders. Integration could in theory be achieved by abolishing the
corporate tax altogether and by treating all corporations as pass-through
vehicles, but because this is administratively complex and because of the
collection advantages afforded by the corporate form, integration is instead
achieved by levying a withholding tax at the corporate level and then
crediting that tax against the shareholder's individual liability. (This
method is sometimes called an "imputation" method because corporate
taxes are imputed to shareholders, and the credits given to shareholders are
sometimes called imputation credits.)
The second method of achieving integration emphasizes the distinctions among the various ways of dividing the active profits of the firm
among different types of investments: dividends, interest, royalties, and
wages. From this perspective, there is no justification for the disparate
treatment afforded interest, royalties, and wages, all of which are
deductible from the corporate tax base when paid, and dividends, which are
not deductible. Thus, integration may be achieved by making dividends
deductible. This method of integration achieves the same mathematical
results as the first one but in a different form.
A third method of achieving integration emphasizes the desire to avoid
taxing the same income twice. From this perspective, integration can be
achieved by retaining the corporate tax with no changes, but excluding
dividends from income. This is the proposal that was advanced by the
United States Treasury Department in its 1992 report on integration.'

Its major difference from the other two proposals is that it does not permit
progressive taxation of dividend income because such income is only taxed
at the corporate level, typically at a flat rate, regardless of the ability to
pay of the shareholder who ultimately bears the burden of the tax.
Of these three methods, deducting dividends at the corporate level and
excluding dividends at the shareholder level do not pose a significant
problem for the international consensus identified above. In both cases,
one of the two countries with a legitimate claim to tax income earned
through a corporation gives up that claim unilaterally. In the case of the
dividend deduction, the source country gives up its right to tax active
income at its source. In the case of the dividend exclusion, the residence

country gives up its right to tax passive income on a residence basis.

249. For discussions of the various methods of achieving integration, see TREASURY INTEGRATION
supra note 46, at 50-54; Warren, supranote 245.
250. TREASURY INTEGRATIONREPORT, supra note 46, at 11-25 (proposing a "dividend exclusion
prototype" that would exclude dividends from gross income).
REPORT, supranote 46; ALI INTEGRATIONREPORT,
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Although there may be good policy arguments against either of these
changes,"' the changes do not disturb the consensual allocation of
income among other countries, which are free to maintain a classical or
integrated system of taxation as they see fit.
Most countries that have integrated tax systems, however, treat the
corporate income tax as a withholding device and grant domestic (but not
foreign) shareholders an imputation credit for the corporate tax that is
applied against the shareholders' individual tax liability. 2 Refusing to
grant the credit to foreign shareholders violates the principle of nondiscrimination, 3 but granting such a credit would, if it were respected by the
residence country, shift the revenue loss from integration from the source
country to the residence country, which may not have an integrated tax
system. The result would be a violation of the principle of reciprocity
because the residence country, if it has a classical system, would not grant
a similar benefit to shareholders from the source country. Moreover,
granting the imputation credit to foreign shareholders would also violate the
principle of neutrality because shareholders from the residence country
would have an incentive to invest in and receive dividends from sourcecountry corporations. This incentive would exist because dividends from
source-country corporations would entitle shareholders to a credit, but
dividends from domestic corporations would not.
Because of these considerations, it seems unlikely that in a world in
which some countries maintain classical tax systems, integration credits
could generally be extended to foreign shareholders. This conclusion was
reached by the Ruding Committee, which was asked to study the integration issue in the context of achieving harmonization of direct taxation
in the European Union.'
The Ruding Committee recommended the
adoption of a system of harmonized direct taxation in the European Union
that is quite similar to the worldwide proposal set out in this Article. In
general, the Committee recommended that passive income be taxed in the
Union entirely on a residence basis and that withholding taxes be abolished
on dividends, interest, and royalties, with backup withholding imposed on
dividends for the benefit of residence countries.55 The Committee also
recommended that active income be taxed on a source basis, with

251. See the discussion supra subpart I(B), concerning why countries should not abandon either
source-based taxation of active income or residence-based taxation of passive income.
252. For comparative views of integration systems, see TREASURY INTEGRATION REPORT, supra
note 46, at 158-84; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of CorporatePreference Items Under an
Integrated Tax System: A ComparativeAnalysis, 44 TAx LAW. 195, 196-98 (1990).
253. See Warren, supra note 14, at 601.
254. COMMISSION OF THE EuROPEAN COMMUNTmIs, REPORT OF THE COMMIrrTEE OF
INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON COMPANY TAXATION (1992) [hereinafter RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT].
For a discussion of the RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT, see Ault, supra note 14, at 590-93.
255. RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 254, at 203-04.
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arbitration procedures established to mitigate, if not to eliminate, transferpricing disputes. 6
Because the European Union contains countries that maintain classical
systems, such as the Netherlands, and countries that have adopted
integrated systems with imputation credits, the Ruding Committee recognized both the need to prevent discrimination and preserve neutrality in the
taxation of capital flows. Therefore, the Committee recommended that
member states with integrated tax systems be required: (a) to grant
domestic shareholders credit for foreign corporate taxes paid at the source
to other member states, to the extent that dividends received by the
shareholders from domestic corporations represent income taxed in those
other states, and (b) to grant domestic shareholders credit for dividends
received directly from foreign corporations that have paid corporate level
taxes at the income's source. 7 However, the Committee explicitly
refrained from recommending that member countries be required to grant
imputation credits to foreign shareholders in order to preserve the taxation
of active business income by the source country.25 8
The system recommended by the Ruding Committee preserves
neutrality and reciprocity at the expense of nondiscrimination.
A
shareholder from a country with an integrated tax system would receive
integration credits whether she invests in a domestic corporation (without
regard to the source of that corporation's income) or in a foreign corporation. These credits would come at the expense of the residence country's
fisc, with the source country retaining its full entitlement to the corporate
level tax. From the perspective of a shareholder from a country with a
classical system, no credits would be obtainable from either a domestic or
foreign investment.
Although the resulting compromise is not perfect-it permits the
source country to discriminate between domestic shareholders (entitled to
a credit) and foreign shareholders (not entitled to a credit)-the
recommendations of the Ruding Committee appear to offer the greatest
likelihood of achieving consensus in a world in which some countries
continue to maintain a classical system. If, however, the United States,
which is the most important advocate of classical corporate taxation, ever
adopts an integrated tax regime, most of the world is likely to follow. In
that case, a reciprocal granting of integration credits would be easy to
achieve without undoing the international consensus described in this
Article.

256. Id. at 205.
257. Id. at 207-08.
258. Id. at 208.

